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1. Introduction and Abstract 
 
Since the Real Option Theory was first introduced by Myers in 1977, its arguments had 
a great impact on decision making processes inside firms. Still, this theory is young in 
comparison and especially its importance in the field of outsourcing decisions is yet to 
be explored to a greater extent. It always has been vital to firms to know their strengths 
and weaknesses in order to make the right sourcing decisions. 
There are many well-established theories surrounding the decision making aspect; all of 
them have their certain assumptions and different lines of argument. Therefore one has 
to distinguish between different models like Transaction Cost Theory, Resource Based 
View or Real Option Theory, because the theory of the firm, meaning the way we 
describe an organization, is directly related to decision making inside the firm. 
Outsourcing inevitably is one of the most controversial topics to be considered by a 
firm’s management. These kinds of decisions involve significant risks and benefits, 
which make it very important to measure the outcome in a realistic and convenient way. 
In the last decade the Real Option Analysis has become a popular tool in certain 
industrial segments (especially in financial industries), but the reliability of the 
underlying models still is questionable. That especially applies to sourcing decisions, 
because questions of vertical disintegration always are associated to a vast range of 
risks. Therefore there certainly is urgent need for an authentic management framework 
in this area. 
 
In the paper I will first introduce the main concepts of Financial Options in order to 
make the understanding of Real Options easier; those two derivative concepts share a 
common basis, nevertheless there are some strikingly important differences that need to 
be explained. During that process I will explain the option terminology, differentiate 
between call and put options and show how a change in one underlying variable 
(ceteris paribus) changes the overall value of an option. 
Basic Concepts of Real Options will be examined, thereby also looking at valuation 
purposes, such as the Discounted Cash Flow and the Net Present Value method. Those 
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models almost perfectly apply to Financial Options; when it comes to Real Option 
valuation, however, those concepts are less reliable by far. In the following a possible 
classification of Real Options will be drawn, including the options of timing, staging, 
exit, operating, flexibility, switching, growth and compound options. 
 
Then I will present the main differences as well as similarities between the widely used 
decision making theories, focussing on the Transaction Cost Theory, Resource Based 
View and Real Option Theory. With respect to the different theories I will point at the 
different assumptions underlying those schemes and describe their theoretical 
underpinnings. Various opinions of different authors will be included in this section – 
supporting ones as well as criticizing ones. Within this section the focus will be put on 
Real Option Theory and some individual options will be explained to greater extent, 
such as options to defer investment, growth options, embedded options, shadow options 
and option chains. Also investment timing (considering the option to wait), 
technological platforms, technology positioning and restructuring profiles will be taken 
into account. 
 
The decisive part of this paper will be the application of Real Option Theory on 
sourcing decisions. Therefore I will first introduce some ideas that are important in 
sourcing decisions, concentrating on core competencies, partial outsourcing and 
equilibrium models (industry equilibrium, a duopoly case and Bertrand competition). 
Another important part will display analogies to other networking forms, drawing 
similarities to joint ventures and supply chain management in the high technology 
sector and the automobile sector. Lastly, more theoretical underpinnings and some 
valuation purposes will be introduced. 
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1.1. Methods 
 
First I want to emphasize that my interest in this scientific field was inspired by the 
seminar “Internationale Unternehmensführung”, of which the central theme was the 
issue of outsourcing. During the course and while reading through the material I started 
to identify an incredible range of aspects that needed to be considered when discussing 
the question whether to vertically integrate or vertically disintegrate. My concern was 
further amplified by the introduction of the Real Option Analysis, because an approach 
on a financial derivatives basis to solve sourcing decisions appeared to be a very 
creative way to shed light on a yet well established topic from a whole new direction. 
Unfortunately I had volunteered for a different topic, but the motivation to do a thesis 
in this scientific area remained. 
 
I made myself familiar with this topic through an extensive literature research. I have 
been searching in different kinds of public as well as academical libraries. In addition, 
my intention was to include different scientific papers – some of them were cited 
explicitly in literature, others were found through databank research (like 
ABI/INFORM Global, Blackwell Synergy, JSTOR, NBER working papers, 
ScienceDirect, Wirtschaftswissenschaften OLC-SSG, etc.). 
For the first part of my thesis I have used literature in the field of financial 
mathematics, in order to explain the world of financial derivatives. During my research 
I found various authors describing the concept of Real Options. Concerning 
Transaction Cost Economies and Resource Based View there, without any doubt, was 
enough literature to cover the demands of this thesis. My task was to highlight the 
different theories from different points of view; the goal was not to present them as 
independently invulnerable and dogmatic theories, but also to show their shortcomings 
and disadvantages. 
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1.2. Conceptual Formulation 
 
Up to now, scientific research and application of the Real Option Analysis was mainly 
associated with strategic alliances (especially joint-ventures), supply chain management 
and networking. In my opinion the scope of the Real Option Theory should be extended 
in greater form to clearly and more intensively address outsourcing decisions. 
The Real Option Theory itself derives directly from the derivatives theory of financial 
options. In some fields the Real Option Analysis approach is better established than in 
others. Therefore many works I have included in this paper did not have, at first sight, a 
direct connection to sourcing relationships. I wanted to draw analogies and work out 
the main parameters of outsourcing decisions. The goal was to establish a broad 
framework for outsourcing decisions on a Real Option basis. 
 
Nevertheless, one must not forget that also the Real Option Theory has its obvious 
shortcomings: it is a stochastic model that works on basis of approximations. 
Uncertainty and volatility seem to be underestimated in many cases. Such over-
evaluations are regularly vended as an entity’s future potential to the public, which in 
turn makes it a more attractive target to investors. One can see that many different and 
sometimes contradicting interests come into play, which makes the decision making 
process even more delicate. 
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2. Financial Options 
 
„An option is the right, but not the obligation, to buy (or sell) an asset under specified 
terms. Usually there are a specified price and a specified period of time over which the 
option is valid.”1  
Options are financial derivatives. Derivatives are used to understand contracting under 
uncertainty, as has been argued by Scholes (1998). According to him, “any security is a 
derivative if its price dynamics depends on the dynamics of some other underlying asset 
or assets and time”2 The first option-like financial instruments date back to the 17th 
century, when they were traded on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Financial options 
generally save transaction costs and can be designed for both speculative and hedging 
purposes, although due to liquidity purposes, they are better for hedging. In theory 
everything can be hedged but the targets are mostly interest movements, foreign 
exchange rates and commodity price exposures. 
I want to cite a now-famous example, stipulating that most financial contracts can be 
interpreted within a derivative regime: “equity holders of a firm with debt in its capital 
structure have an option to buy back the firm from its debt-holders at maturity of the 
debt"3 
 
In the following I want to present the option terminology: 
• The quantity and class of what can be bought or sold has to be defined; the 
asset in question is called underlying 
• A strike price (also labelled exercise price) is specified. At this certain price 
the option holder can exercise the option 
• Parties have to agree on the duration of the option – an expiration date is 
defined 
• One has to distinguish between two types of options: 
                                                 
1 Luenberger, D.G. (1998), p. 319 
2 Scholes, M.S. (1998), p. 351 
3 Scholes, M.S. (1998), p. 364 
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o American option: here the option holder can exercise the option at any 
time up to expiration date 
o European option: exercise is allowed only at expiration date 
• The price of an option is called the option premium 
• Settlement terms have to be negotiated; for instance the actual asset can be 
delivered; cash settlement is another common possibility 
• The option holder possesses the right to buy or sell the option; in this case one 
speaks of a long option 
• The option writer has the obligation to buy or sell the option; in this case one 
speaks of a short option 
• Option value = intrinsic value + time value, whereas 
o The intrinsic value of an option is the value that the option has in case 
of immediate exercise and 
o the time value of the option is always a positive probability of a 
favourable underlying price movement 
 
These features generally characterize an option. 
Normally two parties are involved: one writes (i.e. grants) the option, the other 
purchases the option. There are various ways of determining the value of an option. 
Those concepts will be presented later to greater extent – just keep in mind that the 
dynamic structure of both financial and real options is fundamental and causes huge 
problems in valuation. The owner of an option gains flexibility, because he can exercise 
the option in favourable states of nature or not exercise in unfavourable states. 
Financial options play a very important role in business, because they are an excellent 
instrument for controlling risk. One can agree on option-style contracts on basically 
everything; most common, however, are options on stocks, currencies, futures, bonds, 
indices and other options. Because the owner of an option is not obliged to buy or sell, 
the value of an option can only be positive and, at worst, be zero. 
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2.1. Call Options 
 
A call option “gives the holder the right but not the obligation to buy the underlying 
asset by a certain date for a certain price” 4 A graphical interpretation of a (long) call 
option can be seen below. The option holder makes a profit if the price of the 
underlying rises to such an extent that he is compensated for the pre-paid premium: 
 
 
Figure 1: Payoff of a long European Call option  
 
As long as the price of the underlying lies below the strike price, the option is said to de 
“out of the money”, if the strike price equals the price of the underlying, the option is 
“at the money” and if the price of the underlying exceeds the strike price, the option is 
“in the money”. Note that the hypothetical profit is unbounded. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Hayden, E. (2006), p. 26 
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2.2. Put Options 
 
A put option “gives the holder the right but not the obligation to sell the underlying 
asset by a certain date for a certain price”5 Again, a graphical interpretation of a (long) 
put option can be seen below. The option holder makes a profit if the price of the 
underlying falls to such an extent that he is compensated for the pre-paid premium: 
 
 
Figure 2: Payoff of a long European Put option 
 
Please note that the value of the underlying can not fall below zero; therefore the value 
of a put option has a boundary. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Hayden, E. (2006), p. 26  
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2.3. Comparative Statistics 
 
In this section I want to analyze how the price of a call option reacts to changes in the 
underlying variables (ceteris paribus). 
• The higher the spot rate, the more valuable is the option 
• The higher the exercise price, the less valuable is the option 
• The higher the volatility of the underlying, the more valuable is the option 
• The higher the domestic (risk free) interest rate, the more valuable is the option, 
because a call option replicates the purchase of an underlying today but paying at 
date of expiration 
The results are summarized in the following table: 
 
Variable Call Option Put Option 
Price of underlying + _ 
Strike price _ + 
Volatility + + 
Domestic interest rate + _ 
Table 1: Put and Call Options – Comparative Statistics, Source: adapted from Hayden (2006), p.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real Option Analysis and its Application on Outsourcing                                     14 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
3. Real Options 
 
According to Scholes (1998) “Real options indicate that even the investment decisions 
of firms are better understood by using an option framework rather than a more 
conventional present-value-analysis framework”6 
 
One can explain the creation of a real option as an entrepreneurial process which 
transforms inventive ideas into profitable innovation. The subsequent development of 
competence necessary to exercise the option sets up boundaries, based on theories of 
the firm, for the often overoptimistic real option evaluation. Real options provide a way 
of valuing projects in terms of future benefits. Options provide a way of estimating 
benefits for projects that may or may not become economically viable in the future, but 
are nevertheless valuable in much the same way that an insurance policy protects its 
owner, whether or not an actual claim is filed. They can also be used as a tool to 
evaluate ongoing projects as to whether to deploy, abandon, or continue their 
development, as will be explained to a greater extent later on. 
 
Myers (1977) was the founding father of real option theory, realizing that corporate 
growth opportunities can be seen as long call options. His influential paper 
“Determinants of corporate borrowing” established a completely new scientific field. 
Myers argued that debt policy would be carried out in response to imperfect markets 
and that in this context future opportunities would have to be taken into account, 
because they could positively contribute to an entity’s value. As corporations normally 
work on a going concern basis, he stipulated that “part of the value of a firm is 
accounted for by the present value of options to make further investments on possibly 
favorable terms.”7 
 
Majd and Pindyck (1987) described the existence of real options by emphasizing that: 
“the payoff from completing the project has some value today which is consistent with 
                                                 
6 Scholes, M.S. (1998), p. 364 
7 Myers, S. (1977), p. 148 
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capital market equilibrium. This value fluctuates stochastically over time […] so that 
its future value is always unknown. Access to the investment opportunity […] is 
analogous to holding a call option on a dividend—paying common stock, where 
‘exercising’ the option is equivalent to making the investment expenditure. As with such 
financial options, increased risk increases the incentive to delay the investment 
expenditure, and for any positive amount of risk, the expenditure is made only when the 
project's value exceeds costs by a positive amount.”8  
 
In Sharp’s (1991) terminology, the existence of real options is contingent on 
uncertainty, a real option being “the ability, but not the obligation, to take advantage of 
opportunities available at a later date that would not have been possible without the 
earlier investment”9 
At present, expansion strategic decisions have option characteristics. This counters the 
point of view in the 60s, where organizations were considered to create buffers against 
uncertainty, which then was the mainstream treatment of risk. “An established firm has 
the choice to exploit its resources in its current activities or to explore new markets”10 
Especially under hypercompetition an option approach is useful, because timing and 
know-how are very important. 
 
McGrath (1997) defined real options in the following way: “Real options theory 
scholar seek to understand classes of investment decisions having a structure similar to 
financial options contracts but for which the assumptions made in valuing financial 
options do not hold. The distinguishing characteristic of an options approach lies in 
firms making investments that confer the ability to select an outcome only if it is 
favourable”11 
 
Following the Chandlerian (1962) definition of the firm, “a firm needs a structure to 
conceive a strategy, and in return, a strategy modifies the structure and resources of 
                                                 
8 Majd, S., Pindyck, R.S. (1987), p. 3 
9 Sharp, D.J. (1991), p. 71 
10 Kim, D-J., Kogut, B. (1996), p. 293 
11 McGrath, R.G. (1997), p. 975 
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the firm so as to be able to follow long-term goals”12 On the other hand, Penrose (1959) 
proposed a different approach to the firm, namely the competence-based approach. 
Most basic it has to be said that firms experience different levels of profit, because of 
heterogeneity of resources. Burger-Helmchen (2004) defined real options in the 
following way:” Making good use of an opportunity that brings value to the firm is 
nowadays called the real option, so holding and being able to strike this real option 
depend fundamentally on the competences and learning activity of the firm.”13 Another 
point of interest is the analogy between core competencies and real options; they share 
three common features: irreversibility, flexibility and uncertainty. “The value of the 
competence is a capital part of the real option value, and conversely future option 
determines partly the competences value.”14 Another vital keyword is “tacit 
knowledge”. Tacit knowledge can be acquired by learning or by experimentation. 
Please note that the building of new competences is not instantaneous. 
Irreversibility also has a positive effect, because it represents some sort of entry barrier, 
which distracts potential imitators from entering the market. Also uncertainty (market 
or technological uncertainty) may have positive as well as negative effects on the real 
option value. Market uncertainty is mostly an exogenous uncertainty, whereas 
technological uncertainty is somewhat more endogenously characterized. 
 
Kirzner (1979) famously defined the term “opportunities”: “Opportunities (and not yet 
options) come into existence when individuals (individuals, decision makers, firms) 
have different beliefs in the possibilities offered by the available or potential resources 
to transform some inputs into some outputs that can be sold and raise a profit”15 
Another author (Schumpeter, 1934) distinguished between invention and innovation; 
Another important concept is the “entrepreneurial resource”. Again Kirzner (1979) 
spoke of “entrepreneurial alertness”, meaning the ability of a businessman to detect 
market niches and make profits. Assumptions have to be made, which makes an ex ante 
analysis more vulnerable to mistakes. 
                                                 
12 Burger-Helmchen, T. (2004), p. 4 
13 Burger-Helmchen, T. (2004), p. 5 
14 Burger-Helmchen, T. (2004), p. 24 
15 Burger-Helmchen, T. (2004), p. 8 
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3.1. Basic Concepts 
 
First, I want to elaborate on a statement of the problem based on Myers’ (1977) 
findings: a firm’s value depends on assets already in place –valued on basis of market 
values and/or market values. The assumptions are that markets are perfect and 
complete, that bankruptcy costs are equal to zero and that there are no corporate taxes. 
The value of an entity can be calculated as the value of current assets plus the value of 
future growth opportunities. These opportunities require capital costs today, but are 
expected to yield positive future cash flows. 
Imagine a firm with no current assets and only one future investment opportunity. It is 
easy to see that if the option expires, the corporation would be worthless. A graphical 
explanation of the firm’s decision under those circumstances can be seen in the below 
inserted figure: 
 
 
Figure 3: “The firm’s investment decision under all-equity financing as a function of the state of 
the world, s, at the decision point” Source: Myers, S. (1977), p. 152 
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Secondly, the link between borrowing and the market value of the firm has to be 
analyzed, continuing the above stated example. Following Myers’ (1977) line of 
argument, one arrives at an additional assumption, namely that “the proceeds of the 
debt issue are used to reduce the required initial equity investment.”16 and that 
shareholders are able to borrow the total value of the firm. The probably most 
compelling situation arises when the issued debt reaches its time to maturity after the 
corporate option has expired. This constitutes a break-even state, because creditors will 
receive no payments – remember that the only value-contributing item is the future 
investment opportunity – if this growth option is not exercised. Because of that the firm 
can not borrow additional capital, even by offering a higher interest rate, beyond some 
critical point. These dynamics are summarized in the following figure: Under such 
circumstances the optimal policy is to issue no debt at all. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: “Firm and debt values as a function of payment promised to creditors” Source: Myers, S. 
(1977), p. 154 
 
                                                 
16 Myers, S. (1977), p. 152 
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Interestingly, “The example shows how the existence of corporate debt can reduce the 
present market value of the firm by weakening the corporation’s incentive to undertake 
good future investments.”17 The extreme example established leads to an equally 
extreme result: corporations whose value mostly consists of future growth opportunities 
would issue no risky debt at all. 
 
Thirdly, it is important to mention that a real option can be defined as a call option on a 
real asset with an exercise price equal to capital commitments required to acquire the 
asset. The decision whether to exercise the option depends on the amount of promised 
payments to bondholders. Conceptually, the term “discretionary investment” is a 
critical one and can be explained in the following way: one can distinguish options by 
determining if their ultimate value depends on further discretionary investments or not, 
meaning if additional investments are necessary or not. “Discretionary” in the sense 
that all variable costs follow a discretionary distribution. 
 
Fourthly, the question arises how a firm can decide whether to exercise the option or 
not. As we have seen, the decision depends on the promised payment amount to 
creditors. The straightforward way to deal with this obstacle would be to include a legal 
clause in the contract that obliges the firm to initiate and realize every project that has a 
positive net present value. The difficulty is that this clause comes at very expensive 
costs, namely monitoring costs and contract enforcement costs. 
 
Another possibility is to rewrite the debt contract: in order to prevent the clause to be an 
empty promise, it has to be somehow enforceable. All stakeholders would have to sign 
the contract as well (and as individuals), because otherwise they would be protected by 
limited liability anyway. Even more critical is the aspect that there hardly exits a case 
imaginable where one can objectively judge when the optimal moment to exercise the 
option has been reached. Probably the only enforceable contract would be to oblige the 
company to take on literally every investment project. This solution neither can be 
optimal, because it means that the entity would also have to accept projects with a 
                                                 
17 Myers, S. (1977), p. 155  
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negative net present value and poor future prospects. Also renegotiating the debt 
contract, although not impossible, is very costly. The same applies to a shortening of 
debt maturities of debt outstanding. Here, “Debt that matures before an investment 
option is to be exercised does not induce suboptimal investment decisions.”18 The 
problem is that monitoring costs are not reduced and that the maintenance of such a 
relationship would be pretty costly, as well. 
In addition, a mediator – an independent fact-finder – could be installed ex post, 
because creditors could insist on that. Maybe it would be better to put the negotiation in 
the hands of a third, external party than to bargain bilaterally. Nevertheless, the timing 
problem persists, because the time point when the mediator would be called in can not 
be defined objectively. 
 
Jeffery Halis (1976) proposed a restriction on dividends; he “described how restricting 
dividend payments can protect against the suboptimal investment decisions induced by 
risky debt.”19 In the case of restricting dividends, the firm still must invest in 
something. For various reasons also this approach only yields a partial solution of the 
problem, because there are still monitoring costs, investment incentives are not 
perfectly aligned (shareholders will prefer risky assets) and the company may be 
pressured to invest in projects with a negative net present value. 
A rather idealistic approach requires the firm to issue a compliance statement, 
announcing a policy of exercising all options with a positive net present value – the 
compliance of this self-obligation yet would depend on the company’s honesty alone. 
Finally, a very hypothetical concept is based on a secondary market for real assets: “In 
each period the firm will compare the present value of using the asset (for at least one 
more period) with the cash it could obtain by selling it. If it decides to use the asset, it is 
in effect investing the secondary market value.”20 An offsetting effect would be 
observable if the growth potential of an asset would be exactly equal to the “debt 
capacity” of the same asset. This effect is not transferable into real world. 
 
                                                 
18 Myers, S. (1977), pp. 158f. 
19 Myers, S. (1977), p. 159 
20 Myers, S. (1977), p. 162  
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As we have assumed previously, an entity’s value comprises of its real assets and its 
real options. The sheer existence of real options implies imperfect markets and the 
ongoing analysis unconditionally depends on those imperfections. Another critical 
argument is that the value of an option, in case it is not exercised, vanishes. This 
dissolving can be justified in basically two ways: Real options may be firm-specific, 
thereby having zero value for other market participants and if the real option is not 
firm-specific, it could be traded on a secondary market. 
 
Dixit (1992) stated that investment in theory would differ a lot from investment 
decisions in practice. In general, firms only invest if prices rise over long run average 
costs substantially – i.e. they are more reluctant to invest than in theory; the same effect 
can be observed when it comes to disinvestment decisions. Some authors argue that 
such inertia can indeed be optimal in an uncertain environment. 
Another interrelationship tells us that if opportunity costs are large, the value of the 
investment is reduced. Regarding flexibility, it has to be said that projects often can be 
carried out using different construction techniques. They primarily differ in providing 
different levels of flexibility. Technologies have to be ranked with respect to this 
flexibility, because technologies allowing a greater flexibility are more expensive, 
affecting total investment. 
 
During our analysis the existence of real options has been determined exogenously and, 
notably, stockholders are the ones, who were investing, as opposed by bondholders, 
who made no investments – as an outcome there is a transfer of capital from 
stockholders to bondholders. Summing up one can say that “the amount of debt issued 
by the firm should be set equal to that amount which maximizes the market value of the 
firm.”21 The main assumptions stated that managers are able to write contracts and to 
specify a distribution of returns. 
 
 
                                                 
21 Myers, S. (1977), p. 170 
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3.1.1. Valuation 
 
The real options approach is an extension of options theory towards management of 
real assets. Real option tools enhance the traditional approaches to capital budgeting 
and valuation and are not publicly traded and replicable like financial options. Still, it is 
possible to use the pricing method of financial options to understand them and calculate 
their values. 
In a world of uncertainty, companies have the flexibility to defer a project to adjust its 
scale (expansion, contraction, or abandonment) and to extend or shorten the life of the 
project in response to technological and economic developments over time. These 
opportunities and flexibilities can be valued using pricing methods of financial put and 
call options. 
Real option analysis generalizes the traditional valuation methods such as Net Present 
Value (NPV) or Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) to take the values of the different 
options associated with the investment into account. During that process imprecision is 
inevitable, because we are moving from a hypothetical world to the real world, where 
many assumptions that have been established earlier do not longer hold. 
 
3.1.1.1. Discounted Cash Flow 
 
DCF is a valuation method used to estimate the attractiveness of an investment 
opportunity. Discounted cash flow analysis uses future cash flow projections and 
discounts them (mostly using the weighted average cost of capital) to arrive at a present 
value, which in turn is utilized to evaluate the potential for future investment. If the 
computed value at time to maturity is higher than the current cost of the investment, the 
opportunity generally can be considered a valuable one. 
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Purpose of a DCF analysis is to estimate the profit one would make from an investment 
and to adjust the expected profit by the time value of money. Instead of trying to project 
cash flows towards infinity, a terminal value approach is regularly used. In this case 
annuities are used to estimate the terminal value. 
 
3.1.1.2. Net Present Value 
 
NPV is used in capital budgeting to analyze the profitability of an investment or 
project. NPV analysis is sensitive to the reliability of future cash inflows that an 
investment or project will yield. 
 
NPV compares the value of a dollar today to the value of that same dollar in the future, 
taking inflation and returns into account. If the NPV of a prospective project is positive, 
it should be accepted. However, if the NPV is negative, the project should be rejected 
because of a negative cash flow structure. 
 
3.1.1.3. Problems with Real Option valuation 
  
NPV or DCF analyses are based on one or all of the following assumptions: The 
investment is an ‘all or nothing’, ‘now or never’, project and is held passively. A single 
expected cash flow forecast is used; therefore all possible future cash flows and their 
probabilities, for any given time, are collapsed into a single expected cash flow. The 
main problems are huge variations when picking different proxies for discount rates 
and cash flows, because DCF is merely a mechanical valuation tool, which makes it 
subject to the axiom "garbage in, garbage out". Small changes in inputs can result in 
large changes in the value of a company. This ignores the fact that managers can take 
advantage of futures developments. Managers can add value to the project by 
responding to changing circumstances – making the most of opportunities when 
conditions turn out to be better than expected or reducing losses when conditions turn 
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out to be worse than expected. The expected cash flows are discounted using a constant 
risk-adjusted interest rate, which implies that risk is assumed to be constant over the 
lifecycle of the project. 
Real option analysis generalizes the NPV and the DCF rules by including the values of 
different options and opportunities associated with the investment. 
 
McDonald and Siegel (1986) noted that the classical NPV decision rule does not hold, 
because in a Real Option case “The rule ‘invest if the net present value of investing 
exceeds zero’ is only valid if the variance of the present value of future benefits and 
costs is zero or if the expected rate of growth of the present value is minus infinity”22 
 
Majd and Pindyck (1987) argued in a similar direction by stating that many investment 
projects would have similar characteristics: first, spending decisions and cash outlays 
often occur sequentially over time; secondly, there is a maximum rate at which outlays 
and construction can proceed - it takes "time to build"; Thirdly, the project yields no 
cash return until it is actually completed. 
“Time to build” still is an important suggestion, because it has heavy impact on the 
investment project: “the effects of time to build are greatest when uncertainty is 
greatest, when the opportunity cost of delay is greatest, and when the maximum rate of 
construction is lowest.”23 
 
In this context, classical discounted cash flow methods again are inadequate, because 
they could lead to heavy overinvestment. Therefore other option pricing methods have 
to be used. The corporation faces an investment problem, because, as new information 
arrives over time, the firm has to make sequential and irreversible commitments. Majd 
and Pindyck (1987) gave the examples of aircraft and mining industries, where those 
characteristics are of high relevance. Empirically, one can observe that it might still pay 
off to enter into a project with has a negative net present value at initial stages. Because 
of the irreversible investment problem, it is natural that “uncertainty over project 
                                                 
22 McDonald, R., Siegel, D. (1986), p. 708 
23 Majd, S., Pindyck, R.S. (1987), p. 17 
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returns creates an incentive (an ‘option value’) to postpone the investment and wait for 
more information to arrive, even if the firm is risk neutral.”24 
The value of an investment project is positively related to the degree of volatility. 
Dynamic option valuation techniques have a great advantage over traditional net 
present value valuations: they enable for flexibility during construction period. 
 
Sharp (1991) proved that even using the famous Black-Scholes formula, one simply 
cannot precisely calculate the value of a real option. His lines of argument are 
summarized in the figure below. Note that in Sharp’s system the value of an option 
depends on uncertainty and duration of an investment project; hence, the longer the 
time horizon and the more environmental uncertainty involved, the higher the option 
value. 
 
Short-Term Project    Long-Term Project 
 
Figure 5: “Option value of an investment project under different degrees of uncertainty and different time 
horizon” Source: Sharp, D.J. (1991), p. 71 
 
So the main problem remains: what is the value of a real option? Maybe Luehrmann 
was right and honest enough by saying that managers should “take an educated guess”. 
There are many different approaches in valuating real options; therefore the results 
vary, due to contrary hypotheses. Before a real option is created, firms face the 
                                                 
24 Majd, S., Pindyck, R.S. (1987), p. 2 
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additional problem of evaluating shadow options, i.e. “The output of the knowledge 
building process”25 
 
Already in the early 20th century it was understood that stock prices could be described 
by stochastic models – namely diffusion models. These ideas relied on the concept of 
equilibrium pricing, because it “separates the preferences of traders and the formation 
of market prices.”26 Taking hedging into account, i.e. the creation of a riskless position, 
one finds it hard to translate this technique into real option world. Furthermore, utility 
preferences of managers are not treated properly. NPV analyses do not only undervalue 
investments in innovation, but additionally a possible postponement of an investment 
has a strong impact on the NPV and the initial investment may be uncorrelated with the 
market. 
 
Looking at real options, the definition of pricing a real option is the following: “actors 
consider irreversible investments under dynamic uncertainty. By dynamic, it is meant 
that the uncertainty endures over a period of time and initial decisions are subsequently 
revisited. In this environment, choice is both ex ante and ex post simultaneously. Actors 
decide what to do based on the realization of current prices (or events); action is ex 
post to prices. Actors decide what to do based on the future; action is precipitated on 
the basis of expectations.”27 Decision makers have to anticipate an expected future 
decision environment. Such decisions are exposed to various biases, for instance it 
matters a lot if a project is currently in or out of the money. Generally, managers may 
find it attractive to over-evaluate projects, which already led to creation of speculative 
bubbles in the past. On the other hand learning effects inside firms regarding the used 
heuristic models should not be disregarded. In practice, studies show that real option 
valuation is scarcely used by managers, mostly because some of them simply do not 
like to revisit past decision. “Nevertheless, real option considerations appear to 
represent a significant component of value, and firms that take them into account in 
                                                 
25 Burger-Helmchen, T. (2004), p. 15 
26 Kogut, B., Kulatilaka, N. (1994), p. 4 
27 Kogut, B., Kulatilaka, N. (994), p. 6 
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appropriate situations should outperform firms that do not.”28 Firms were largely tied 
to use rules of thumb in order to approximate optimal decisions. 
Concerning decision making rules one has to distinguish between negative rules, such 
as rejecting all projects with a negative NPV, and positive ones, such as carrying out 
option valuations. Positive decision making rules often conflict with biases of 
behavioural and organizational nature. 
A basic but very useful rule is to review performance more frequently – reviews should 
be carried out periodically and option pricing techniques have to be applied. Kogut and 
Kulatilaka (1994) introduced a two-parameter model: the first parameter is uncertainty 
(σ), the second parameter is the status quo bias (k): 
 
 
Table 2: “Value of Project under annual review” Source: Kogut, B., Kulatilaka, N. (1994), p. 14 
 
As one can see, when there is no uncertainty (σ = 0), the option value is negative; 
therefore the option will not be exercised which results in zero value. Looking at the 
status quo bias one can examine that solutions are sub-optimal and that the value of the 
project is reduced. Please note that this applies to the case of annual reviewing. 
The second table shows the results if the project is evaluated on a quarterly basis, 
resulting in “more opportunities for the firm to correct the investment decision and 
avoid regret.”29 The option value is higher in every state of nature, because the status 
quo bias decreases as the reviews increase: 
 
                                                 
28 Kogut, B., Kulatilaka, N. (1994), p. 10 
29 Kogut, B., Kulatilaka, N. (1994), p. 15 
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Table 3: “Value of Project under Quarterly review” Source: Kogut, B., Kulatilaka, N. (1994), p. 15 
 
 
3.2. Types of Real Options 
 
By now it should be obvious that real options can be associated with a broad range of 
business problems. Therefore it is practically impossible to perfectly distinguish 
between different option classes. Myers (1977), for instance, argued that: “One can 
think of real options that are separable, objectively identifiable, relatively long-lived, 
and for which reasonable  secondlyary markets exist. Examples are patents, certain 
trademarks, franchises and operating licenses.”30 In the following, I will present a 
classification mostly based on the classification of Trigeorgis (1996). 
 
3.2.1. Timing Options 
 
The ability to postpone an investment and to decide when it is initiated, allows 
managers to await the arrival of more information about the project. The value of 
postponement must be weighed against the time value of profits from the project. An 
example of timing option is an undeveloped land plot held by a real estate developer. 
For a certain price, the developer can start to build and thus receive cash flows. But 
because there is uncertainty about interest rates, building costs (in this context the 
                                                 
30 Myers, S. (1977), p. 164 
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exercise price) and expected cash flows, it may be valuable to “wait and see” if this 
uncertainty is (partly) resolved as time passes. 
 
3.2.2. Staging Options 
 
Closely related to the timing option is the staging option. This type of option allows the 
holder to invest in a project in small increments. Again, the rationale is that uncertainty 
is resolved by awaiting the arrival of better information, so managers can learn about 
the profitability of project before committing more funds. For some projects, 
uncertainty is not only resolved over time, but investment must be undertaken to learn 
about the true cost or profitability of a project. 
 
3.2.3. Exit Options 
 
This type of option is also one that most people intuitively agree with. It might be 
advantageous for a firm to maintain an “escape route” if an investment should turn out 
to be unsuccessful. A software development firm that employs programmers on short-
term contracts and leases its building and operating assets is in effect buying itself an 
exit option. A premium must be paid to both staff and leasing agencies to be allowed to 
terminate contracts on short notice, but a software development project turned sour can 
be shut down pretty quickly. 
 
3.2.4. Operating Options 
 
Operating options are quite similar to exit options. They come into existence when a 
company scales some of its business processes to react quickly to changes in the 
commercial environment. A manufacturing firm that builds a plant with more excess 
capacity than a “median forecast” would suggest effectively purchases the option to 
take advantage of demand conditions that are stronger than anticipated. 
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3.2.5. Flexibility Options, Switching Options and Incremental Options 
 
Building flexibility into assets so they can be put to several different uses is another 
example of a real option. A bilingual employee is more valuable that one who is not, 
even when there are no immediate plans to send him or her abroad; or consider a power 
plant, which can be operated by coal, oil or natural gas as fuel. If the relative prices of 
the fuels were fixed, there would be no value in building such flexibility; one would 
always opt for the cheapest solution. However, if the relative prices of alternative fuels 
are volatile and not perfectly correlated, one can take advantage of these fluctuations 
and the extra investment in flexibility, clearly has a positive value. 
 
Leiblein and Miller (2003) argued that a switching option comes into existence when 
investing rather small amounts in various product markets. Those kinds of options are 
presumably influencing the decision whether to produce internally or via a sourcing 
arrangement. There are two properties: first, when a firm’s production is well 
diversified across many product markets, a decline in demand in one of the target 
markets has a comparably little effect; secondly, when a technology becomes useless in 
one market, the company can easily shift the application of the technology to another 
product market. Note that the latter argument has greater relevance for industries with 
shorter technology-cycle times. 
Sharp (1991) made the following distinction: incremental options are found in virtually 
all kinds of investments; they are incremental in nature. One example would be 
learning. Flexibility options are different in the sense that they are based on already 
existing investments and therefore do not require additional investments, as opposed by 
incremental options. 
 
3.2.6. Growth Options and Options to Expand 
 
Growth options give a firm the ability to expand its business. Examples include 
research and development, brand development, mergers and acquisitions, leasing or 
Real Option Analysis and its Application on Outsourcing                                     31 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
developing land, or launching a technology initiative. Managers may undertake 
investments that seemingly have little immediate value in terms of expected cash 
inflow, but improve the market position of the firm in the long run. Such investments 
are called “strategic investments” and should form the platform for future expansion. 
Another property of real option theory is the growth option. They are defined as to 
“provide the firm with the right, but not the obligation, to later expand or develop a 
related product or technology.”31 These sorts of options are especially important in 
high technology industries. Under such circumstances it regularly is advantageous to 
keep R&D activities internalized to profit from future usage of technology. 
Demand is uncertain when expanding into a new product market. 
Kogut (1991) stipulated that initial investments are equivalent to buying the right, but 
not the obligation, to expand in future and that the term “real” in Real Option refers to 
the fact that it is an investment in operating and therefore is different to financial 
capital. Furthermore he argues that this future potential, the opportunities of growth can 
represent a high share of a firm’s value. 
 
3.2.7. Compound Options 
 
A compound option combines two or more of the above presented options. As can be 
seen easily, innumerable combinations of various option classes are possible. Below 
you can see some other classifications: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Leiblein, M.J. (2003), p. 949 
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Option Description 
Defer Wait to determine if a better state of nature obtains 
Abandon Obtain salvage value or opportunity cost of the asset 
Shutdown and restart Wait for a better state of nature and re-enter 
Time-to-build Delay or default on a project 
Contract Reduce operations if current state of nature is worse than expected
Switch Use alternative technologies depending on input prices 
Expand Expand if state of nature is better than expected 
Growth Take advantage of interrelated future opportunities 
Table 4: Alternative classification of Real Options, adapted from Trigeorgis (1996) 
  
Majd and Pindyck (1987) also qualified many options as compound options: 
“Formally, the investment program is a contingent claim. However, it is not a simple 
contingent claim: at every instant the manager can choose whether or not to Invest and 
continue construction. Hence the project is a compound option, where each expenditure 
buys an option to make the next expenditure.”32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Majd, S., Pindyck, R.S. (1987), p. 8 
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4. Real Options and Financial Options – similarities and 
differences 
 
Many aspects of financial and real options are quite similar. The most obvious 
difference lies in the scope of definition: financial options exclusively refer to buying or 
selling a clearly defined underlying asset, whereas in a real option world the underlying 
is often not perfectly definable and somewhat vague.  
Using financial options, the investor wants to speculate in order to make profits or 
hedge some specific position against risks; using real options the investor makes a 
capital investment today in order to realize some future potential. Also in the latter case 
the investor is not obliged to carry out further investments, but is free to choose 
whether or not to make additional commitments in future. The main analogies are 
summarized in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 6: “Analogy between financial options and real options (investment opportunities)” Source: 
adapted from Luehrman (1998) 
  
Dixit (1992) drew a nice analogy between financial and real options: “The opportunity 
to make a real investment is akin to an American call option – a right but not an 
obligation to buy a stock at a present price called the strike price or exercise price. For 
the real investment I am considering, the exercise price is the sunk cost of the project. If 
the option is exercised, the firm acquires ownership of a stock that pays a dividend 
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stream […]. The net worth is called the ‘intrinsic value’ of the option. But exercising 
the option at the instant at its intrinsic value becomes positive is not optimal, because 
the option also has a value of waiting, called the ‘holding premium’ or the ‘time value’. 
One should wait until the holding premium falls to zero.”33 
 
Burger-Helmchen (2004) also composed analogies between real and financial options: 
“The financial option is one contract specifying the different ‘options’ the buyer and the 
seller have, and none can influence the value of the option. In the opposite for a real 
option, the different action that the firm as a whole or the different individuals 
composing the firm can undertake change the value of the firm. This is especially due to 
uncertainty. In the case of financial option the uncertainty is on the underlying asset 
movements, there is no uncertainty in the course of action that must be taken to 
maximise the value of the option holder e.g. if the price of the underlying asset is above 
the striking price at the expiration date, exercise the option. For real options the course 
of action that must be taken is more uncertain and can be modified by organisational 
pressure.”34 In addition, the company has two distinct advantages over the market: 
First, incentives can be aligned in a more effective way and  secondly the firm can 
define its own employment rules. 
Without any doubt there are certain transition problems if one moves from the financial 
world to organizational decisions. There are various technical and theoretical 
challenges that need to be addressed to answer the following question: “does option 
pricing of contingent claims work in the context of organizational and behavioral 
biases?”35 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Dixit, A. (1992), p. 116 
34 Burger-Helmchen, T. (2004), p. 17f. 
35 Kogut, B., Kulatilaka, N. (1994), p. 2 
Real Option Analysis and its Application on Outsourcing                                     35 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
5. Conceptual approaches describing organizational 
decision making 
 
One of the milestones in the evolution of firms’ theory was Coase’s famous scientific 
article “The nature of the firm” (1937). His goal was to establish clear assumptions in 
economic theory. 
His central question was the following: “why is there any organization?”36 Well, the 
main goal of a firm is to coordinate production. One has to keep in mind that planning 
processes within firms are different to planning in a whole economy. And, when 
looking at various sectors of an economy, one notices that even firms are not 
homogenous at all. A firm supersedes the price mechanism. Smith, discussing the 
conception of the capitalist, prominently pointed out that “the undertaker busies himself 
with the division of labour inside each firm and he plans and organises consciously,” 
but “he is related to the much larger economic specialisation, of which he himself is 
merely one specialised unit. Here, he plays his part as a single ceIl in a larger 
organism, mainly unconscious of the wider role he fills”37 The main goal was “to 
bridge what appears to be a gap in economic theory between the assumption (made for 
some purposes) that resources are allocated by means of the price mechanism and the 
assumption (made for other purposes) that this allocation is dependent on the 
entrepreneur-co-ordinator.”38 Most of the discussed problems have been approached 
by other economists earlier, but from a different point of view – mostly from a labour 
division perspective. 
 
Using the price mechanism in markets inherits costs, which gives an incentive to 
establish a firm in order to lower these costs. In general, costs associated with 
organizing production through price mechanism are costs from identifying relevant 
prices, costs from negotiating, costs from transaction contract formation and costs of 
entering a long-term contractual relationship. 
                                                 
36 Coase, R.H. (1937), p. 387 
37 Coase, R.H. (1937), p. 388 
38 Coase, R.H. (1937), p. 388 
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Concluding: “When the direction of resources becomes dependent on the buyer in this 
way, that relationship which I term a "firm" may be obtained”39 This statement is more 
applicable to the service sector than to the commodity sector. Making a final statement, 
Coase (1937) wrote the following: “the operation of a market costs something and by 
forming an organization and allowing some authority (an ‘entrepreneur’) to direct the 
resources, certain marketing costs are saved.”40 
 
Note that it is always possible to switch back to open market transactions. In case of 
complete certainty, no firms would be established, because resources would be 
allocated exclusively via the price mechanism. “A firm, therefore, consists of the system 
of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is 
dependent on an entrepreneur”41 The firm therefore grows as additional transactions 
are organized by the entrepreneur. It is important to mention that the relationship 
between size and efficiency is generally unclear, but a possible formation of a 
monopoly gives incentive for continuous and unlimited expansion. 
 
To examine the issue from a contrary point of view the question to ask would be why 
do – under uncertainty – market transactions occur, if production costs are lowered 
within firms? The first argument is diminishing marginal returns with respect to the 
degree of organization, the  secondly failure to put the factor inputs to its best use and 
Thirdly the price of one needed production factor might rise if the firm gets bigger. 
These lines of argument can be summed up as diminishing return to management. 
Regarding these ideas it is also important to note that “once it becomes economical to 
have a market transaction, it also pays to divide production in such a way that the cost 
of organizing an extra transaction in each firm is the same.”42 
There is a trade-off between diminishing returns to management and rising supply 
prices, so the question is which factor tends to be more important. Coase presented the 
following arguments: 
                                                 
39 Coase, R.H. (1937), p. 390 
40 Coase, R.H. (1937), p. 390 
41 Coase, R.H. (1937), p. 391 
42 Coase, R.H. (1937), p. 392 
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“Other things being equal, therefore, a firm will tend to be larger: 
a. the less the costs of organizing and the slower these costs rise with an increase in the 
transactions organized. 
b. the less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes and the smaller the increase in 
mistakes with an increase in the transactions organized. 
c. the greater the lowering (or the less the rise) in the supply price of factors of 
production to firms of larger size.”43 
A firm basically can expand in two forms: via combination or via integration: “There is 
a combination when transactions which were previously organized by two or more 
entrepreneurs become organized by one. This becomes integration when it involves the 
organization of transactions which were previously carried out between the 
entrepreneurs on a market.”44 
He stated that the price mechanism itself forms an integrating force in the economy. 
The remaining question is “why one integrating force (the entrepreneur) should be 
substituted for another integrating force (the price mechanism).45 Uncertainty implies 
that future wants of consumers have to be predicted by entrepreneurs. 
Summing up, one can say that the definitions of Coase (1937) seem to be fairly 
realistic; the vital question is “will it pay to bring an extra exchange transaction under 
the organizing authority?”46 The method behind his theory works in the following way: 
“Initiative means forecasting and operates through the price mechanism by the making 
of new contracts. Management proper merely reacts to price changes, rearranging the 
factors of production under its control.”47 
 
Conner (1991) argued that management would have to identify if inputs are likely to 
generate rents in the short but also in the long run. She concentrated on inputs able to 
generate rents: The process of discerning relevant inputs relies on managerial intuition 
and vision. Nonetheless, is has to be mentioned that for such inputs two types of 
constraints are in existence: 
                                                 
43 Coase, R.H. (1937), p. 393 
44 Coase, R.H. (1937), p. 393 
45 Coase, R.H. (1937), p. 394 
46 Coase, R.H. (1937), p. 399 
47 Coase, R.H. (1937), p. 399 
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External constraints on inputs can be summed up in three points: “(a) conditions of 
demand relevant to the product, (b) public policy and (c) entrepreneurial action.”48 In 
this context, a shift in the market position can also result from sheer luck, such as a 
change in consumer taste. 
Internal constraints on inputs depend on the history of the firm, labelled the resource 
endowment. In the spirit of Rumelt (1987) a firm is a “bundle of linked and 
idiosyncratic resources and resource conversion activities”49 Those internally linked 
resources are heavily interrelated. Importantly, it has to be said that input specificity 
can not be the only source of profits. 
A firm can obtain the first-mover advantage if it acquires important resources before 
competitors can do so. This advantage then translates into lower input costs. In this case 
the persistence of rents depends on the contract’s characteristics, namely on its duration 
and the costs of enforcement. If a firm finally is the owner of a specific input, this input 
has to be protected thorough isolating mechanisms, as argued by Rumelt (1987). Such 
isolating mechanisms are for instance the avoidance of imitation by competitors or 
searching and switching costs resulting from incomplete information. 
 
Dierickx and Cool (1989) formed the argument that “ purchasable assets cannot be 
sources of long-lived rents, because these assets can be traded in the market”50 Conner 
(1991) in turn stipulated that the potential rent of an input is dependent upon the 
individual input specificity, meaning that the same input might be more valuable to one 
firm than to another. Nevertheless, she partly shared Dierickx and Cool’s (1989) 
opinion on intangible assets, such as corporate learning, knowledge and competencies. 
Intangible assets cannot be purchased and therefore can be expected to be more 
significant to profits than inputs that can be purchased on the market. 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Conner, K.R. (1991), p. 134 
49 Conner, K.R. (1991), p. 134 
50 Conner, K.R. (1991), p. 137 
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5.1. Transaction Cost Economies 
 
The two primary conceptual insights provided by transaction cost theory are that the 
governance of exchange agreements between economic actors is costly and that 
governance forms vary in their ability to facilitate exchange depending on the attributes 
in the transactional environment. 
 
A very important person for the development of the transaction cost theory is Oliver 
Williamson, whose influential paper “The economic institutions of capitalism” was 
published in 1985. Processes within institutions – namely firms, markets and relational 
contracts – were not described as actions inside a “black box”; therefore the governance 
structure had to be analyzed. Transaction cost economies were applied to “with special 
reference to firms, markets, and relational contracting. […] from discrete market 
exchange at the one extreme to centralized hierarchical organization at the other”51 
 
Coase (1937) was first to formulate the TCE in the 30s. In his words, “ firms and 
market exchange are alternative methods for coordinating production: the 
distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism”52 Via an 
organization, one can save marketing costs and only has to handle one – although more 
complex – contract instead of many. 
Williamson started to extend this approach in the 70s by focusing on opportunistic 
potential. Three conditions are relevant in this case: “asset specificity, small numbers of 
potential transactors, and imperfect information.”53 He argued that if there was no 
opportunistic potential, firms simply would not exist, because their purpose is to 
decrease this kind of potential. 
Further extensions were made by Klein and Leffler (1981) and again Williamson 
(1985) in the 80s. They argued that the opportunistic potential of two independent 
parties can be offsetting and therefore that a stable relationship can be maintained. 
                                                 
51 Williamson, O.E. (1985), p. 16 
52 Conner, K.R. (1991), p. 130 
53 Conner, K.R. (1991), p. 131 
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5.1.1. Assumptions 
 
There are two main assumptions associated with TCE: First, individuals within a firm 
are exposed to bounded rationality and secondly, economic actors are behaving 
opportunistically. That implies that individuals basically are confined in planning the 
future and in assessing all possible alternatives. The accumulation and interpretation of 
information is costly, the same applying to the identification of potentially 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
5.1.2. Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
Williamson stated that TCE, in comparison to other economic organization 
approaches… 
“(1) is more microanalytic,  
(2) is more conscious about its behavioral assumptions, 
(3) introduces and develops the economic importance of asset specificity, 
(4) relies more on comparative institutional analysis, 
(5) regards the business firm as a governance structure rather than a production 
function, and 
(6) places greater weight on the post institutions of contract, with special emphasis on 
private ordering (as compared with court ordering).”54 
Hereby the basic unit of analysis is the transaction. If transactions are assigned to 
governance structures, transaction costs can be minimized. 
The commonly used definition of transaction costs was given by Kenneth Arrow 
(1969): He defined “transaction costs as the ‘costs of running the economic system’”55 
An interesting analogy to the world of physics indicates the following: the absence of 
frictions in physics is an unrealistic assumption – the same applies to its equivalent in 
the economic world, namely transaction costs. Due to the fact that transaction costs 
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could not be described conceptually, they were largely neglected by scientific research. 
Most commonly, the firm was described as a production function. 
 
Transaction costs occur ex ante and ex post of a transaction. Let’s first take a look at the 
ex ante types: 
“The first are the costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement.”56 If 
contracting difficulties occur, parties tend to substitute internal organization for open 
market transactions.  
Ex post costs of contracting arise from different sources: These include 
“(1) the maladaption costs incurred when transactions drift out of alignment in relation 
to what Masahiko Aoki (1983) refers to as the “shifting contract curve” 
(2) the haggling costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct misalignments, 
(3) the setup and running costs associated with the governance structures (often not the 
courts) to which disputes are referred, and 
(4) the bonding costs of effecting secure commitments.”57 
Especially the way in which expected benefits will be divided is target of intense 
bargaining. 
Ex post and ex ante costs of contracting are heavily interdependent and difficult to 
quantify. There are few valid valuation techniques, therefore stochastic models have to 
be applied. 
 
Summing up, there are five relevant TCE factors: 
“1. Holding the nature of the good or service to be delivered constant, economizing 
takes place with reference to the sum of production and transaction costs, whence 
tradeoffs in this respect must be recognized. 
2. More generally, the design of the good or service to be delivered is a decision 
variable that influences demand as well as costs of both kinds, whence design is 
appropriately made a part of the calculus. 
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3. The social context in which transactions are embedded-the customs, mores, habits, 
and so on-have a bearing, and therefore need to be taken into account, when moving 
from one culture to another. 
4. That relies in a general, background efficacy of competition to perform a sort 
between and less efficient modes and’ to shift resources in favour of the especially if the 
relevant outcomes are those which appear over intervals of five and ten years rather 
than in the very near. This intuition would nevertheless benefit from a more fully 
developed theory of the selection process. Transaction cost arguments are thus open to 
some of the same objections evolutionary economists have made of orthodoxy (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982, pp. though in other respects there are strong complementarities (pp. 
34- 38). 
5. Whenever private and social benefits and costs differ, the social cost calculus should 
govern if prescriptive treatments are attempted.”58 
As one can see in the graph inserted below, there is a basic distinction between the 
monopoly and the efficiency branch. To put it more precisely: “The monopoly 
approaches ascribe departures from the classical norm to monopoly purpose. The 
efficiency approaches hold that the departures serve economizing purposes instead.”59 
There are four monopoly approaches: leverage, price discrimination, entry barriers and 
strategic behaviour. The leverage and the price discrimination theory both focus on 
buyers. Entry barriers and strategic behaviour in turn focus on contracting practices in 
response to competitors. They formalize the concerns of a monopoly to lose its 
privileged position. Again, under a neoclassical regime the firm is considered to be a 
production function. 
 
On the efficiency side one finds four approaches as well, namely property rights, 
agency, governance and measurement. Regarding the property rights literature 
“ownership matters, where rights of ownership of an asset take three parts: the right to 
use the asset, the right to appropriate returns from the asset, and the right to change 
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the form and/or substance of an asset.”60 This concept refers to the ex ante side of the 
contract and resource misallocations occur frequently. 
The agency literature basically stipulates that “principals contract in full awareness of 
the hazards that contract execution by agents poses. Thus although the separation of 
ownership from control attenuates profit incentives, that is anticipated at the time 
separation occurs and is fully reflected in the price of new shares.”61 Also in this case 
ex ante decisions are decisive – namely the alignment of incentives. The same problem 
is considered in the principal-agent literature. Here contracting dysfunctions occur due 
to differing private information. The TCE approach is divided into a governance and a 
measurement branch. Under a TCE system the importance of ex ante incentive 
alignments is emphasized. A rather new finding is that also institutions that provide 
support ex ante should be taken into account. The complexity of the problem further 
rises, because “The behavioural attributes of human agents, whereby conditions of 
bounded rationality and opportunism are joined, and the complex attributes of 
transactions […] are responsible for that condition.”62 
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Figure 7: “A cognitive map of contract” Source: Williamson, O.E. (1985), p.24 
Also the world of contract should be discussed to some extent; the world of contract is 
usually described as “one of (1) planning, (2) promise, (3) and (4) governance (or 
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private ordering).”63 The main TCE parameters are bounded rationality, opportunism 
and asset specificity. Four contracting processes result out of those four dimensions, as 
can be seen in the table: 
 
Behavioral Assumption 
Bounded Rationality Opportunism Asset Specificity Implied Contracting Process 
0 + + Planning 
+ 0 + Promise 
+ + 0 Competition 
+ + + Governance 
 
Table 5: “Behavioural assumption” Source: Williamson, O.E. (1985), p. 31 
 
To describe the table more precisely, it can be said that unbounded rationality results in 
a world of planning, that in absence of opportunism a world of promise is prevalent and 
that if assets were unspecific, we would have a world of competition. The last case 
establishes the framework for TCE: “Each of the three devices fails when bounded 
rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity are joined. Planning is necessarily 
incomplete (because of bounded rationality), promise predictably breaks down 
(because of opportunism), and the pairwise identity of the parties now matters (because 
of asset specificity). This is the world of governance.”64 Under such a regime a more 
complex and larger conception of economic problems is supported. 
 
5.1.3. Asset Specificity and Uncertainty 
 
Williamson identified six forms of asset specificity, being site specificity, physical asset 
specificity, human asset specificity, dedicated asset specificity, brand name capital 
specificity and temporal specificity. All those specificities have to be related to 
uncertainty in order to measure their effects on organizational choice. 
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In 1994 Dixit and Pindyck identified two kinds of uncertainty: 
Technical uncertainty: “relates to the likely costs and probabilities of accomplishing 
technical success;”65 This sort of uncertainty puts pressure on the company to invest 
immediately, which leads to timing dilemmas. 
Input cost uncertainty: is related to the outside world of the firm, i.e. it is an exogenous 
factor. This kind of uncertainty is in opposition to the previous one, because it poses an 
incentive to delay investment until the arrival of new information. 
McGrath (1997) conceptualized a third type of uncertainty that lies in between the 
previous two. “It is present when sources of uncertainty are largely ’external’ to the 
firm […] but can be influenced by strategic action.”66 
 
 
5.2. Resource Based View 
 
Conner (1991) examined if the RBV would be elaborated enough to stipulate a 
complete theory of the firm. She compared the RBV to five more established theories 
of the firm. In general, following Holmstrom’s and Tirole’s (1989) argument, a theory 
of the firm should try to answer two vital questions: first, what is the purpose of the 
firm and secondly how are scale and scope of the firm determined. In any case, the 
central goal of a firm in this context is to maximize profits, but it tries to achieve that by 
different means. 
 
She additionally gave the following example: A firm wants to engage in a research 
project to develop a new product. It faces the two possibilities of in-house research or 
contracting an outside team: In-house development will be more attractive, if the 
research project is potentially specific to already existing operations inside the firm, 
because the process of researching alone can already add additional value and the firm 
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might find it advantageous to find the know-how possessor inside its own ranks. 
Remember that rents can stem from the sheer linkedness of a firm’s resources. The firm 
may also find it appealing to form a joint venture, because it “may offer the benefits of 
exposure to outside capabilities, but also can be expected to involve the costs of results 
that are less specific to and harder to redeploy within the firm”67 
The last question addressed by the author was: “Why are the firm’s activities conducted 
as a firm instead of as a collection of market transactions?”68 The RBV establishes a 
reason for the existence of a firm in the absence of opportunism, because it implies “a 
theory of the firm’s existence that turns on advantages (over the market contract) in 
inter-component knowledge transplantation and in the creation-redeployment of 
specific assets.”69 Here, firms exist because they can take advantage of idiosyncratic 
assets through their equally idiosyncratic structure. 
 
5.2.1. Assumptions 
 
The most important assumptions connected with RBV are that profit-maximizing 
entities are directed in a world of bounded rationality and that firms must make up-front 
investments. 
Managers are boundedly rational, which means that they cannot objectively predict and 
measure every single future contingency. Additionally, companies have to invest in 
opportunities whose potential value is vague and uncertain at present time. 
 
5.2.2. Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
Looking at competitive advantage and performance, it can be said that the RBV has 
created four predictions: 
First, certain attributes of resources can be a basis for competitive advantage. RBV in 
this context distinguishes between valuable resources (resulting in a higher willingness 
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to pay and reduced opportunity cost, respectively), rare resources (in this case demand 
is higher than supply) and non-substitutable resources (have a unique value for the 
implementation of a strategy). This classification was confirmed by various empirical 
studies. 
Secondly, RBV theory discusses the question if a competitive advantage might be 
sustainable over time. The resource-based view supports this opinion if competition is 
limited, because under such circumstances successful imitation of crucial resources is 
difficult. 
Thirdly, RBV analyzes the circumstances under which economic profits may be 
realized. The basic logic is that resources have to stimulate more profit than estimated 
at their entrance into the organization. 
Fourthly, companies can experience constant inflow of economic profits by leveraging 
resources (of valuable, rare or costly to imitate nature). These positive effects of 
leveraging can only be realized if competitors cannot anticipate them, if these resources 
are exposed to imperfect mobility (which implies more value to the “host firm”) and if 
these resources are generalizable (i.e. can also be used for new applications). 
 
 
5.3. Comparison TCE - RBV 
 
Conner (1991) compared various organizational theories, thereby focussing on the 
Resource Based View and Transaction Cost Economics. In order to make an exact and 
sound distinction, she concentrated on attributes that are costly to copy, namely 
comparative advantages or core capabilities, because they are the source of economic 
profits. The main aim is to defend such advantageous positions, because resources are 
directly linked to products and therefore to the firm’s payoff. A strategy has to be 
formulated, being a “fit between the internal competencies of the firm and external 
opportunities.”70 
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In this context she also presented the “TCE test” by Coase and Williamson: “for the 
existence of a firm to make sense in some business activity, the firm, with its internal 
network of relationships, must outperform the alternative, in which all such 
relationships are external, arms-length, market transactions.”71 In a RBV context, 
“existence needs to be explained in terms of a firm’s superiority to two alternative 
forms of organization: a collection of market contracts and other firms.”72 
In RBT, the concept of asset specificity is central, whereas the avoidance of 
opportunism has relatively little relevance. “instead of viewing the firm as an ‘avoider 
of a negative’, the resource-based literature tends to see the firm as the ‘creator of a 
positive’, as creator of unique productive value.”73 Firms can also supersede the market 
by higher productivity or higher efficiency. 
 
The objective of any firm in our context is to earn above-normal returns. A firm can 
realize that objective through either distinctiveness (from the consumer’s point of view) 
or through lower costs in production. The central question posed by the RBV is how 
can the firm maintain its advantage of low costs or distinctiveness? The firm in this 
context is an input-combiner. In a RBV world, persistent above-normal earnings are 
possible through the application of uncopyable assets that were achieved through 
innovation. To sum up, “RBT sees these returns as resulting primarily from the acumen 
or luck of the firm in acquiring, combining, and deploying resources.74 Therefore the 
company tries to find unique or at least costly-to-copy inputs. 
The main similarity between RBV and TCE is that “asset specificity and small numbers 
are critical concepts constraining the firm’s strategic options” and the main distinction 
that “the heart of the firm centers on deployment and combination of specific inputs 
rather than on avoidance of opportunism.”75 
 
The main difference between TCE and RBV, again regarding to Conner (1991), is the 
following: In a TCE world, the same inputs are equally effective in the firms or the 
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market – except for problems of opportunism, there would be no difference. Under a 
RBV regime, inputs will be more specific to one firm than to any other institution. 
However that does not mean that the RBV rules out the existence of opportunistic 
behaviour, it only presents a different approach. The firm is an input combiner and 
efficiency seeker with respect to distribution and production; furthermore success also 
depends on the firm’s environment which can be shaped partly by the company itself. 
 
 
5.4. Real Option Analysis 
 
One field of application of ROA lies in organizational strategic management. A 
definition concerning strategy by Schendel and Patton (1978) stipulated that “Strategic 
decisions usually, if not invariably, involve choices regarding the investment of 
organizational resources”76 The key objective of strategic management is to capture 
rents. There are basically two ways of doing so: first through formation of a monopoly, 
secondly through successful application of firm-specific routines that represent a 
comparative advantage. Such relative advantages can be achieved in various ways, for 
instance through learning processes or sheer luck. Due to those situations, different 
firms have different uncertainty profiles, influencing their options. 
This decision making process is exposed to uncertainty. The basic idea is that strategy 
is not something which can be applied exogenously, but it rather emerges directly from 
disposable resources. Options in that context form a process of how to allocate the 
resource investments inside the firm. These processes are subject to many 
interrelationships, which makes the solution anything but trivial. 
 
The idea behind option theory is to leave various alternatives open – “retain the right to 
future investment choices without being obliged to invest (Cox, Rubinstein, 1985)”77 
Sunk cost premium payments are the only risk associated with (long) options. The 
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choice that the owner of the option has to make is to exercise the option, if conditions 
are favourable or to abandon the option, if conditions are unfavourable. Today it is 
commonly accepted that initial, prior investments are necessary to increase the 
probability of later success. 
An option gives “preferential access to an opportunity for investment choice”78 At the 
same time, downside exposure is limited, because the tenant has the right but not the 
obligation to exercise the option. 
“The resource-based analysis gives us minimal values of the real option, and real 
option analysis can give us the maximal values of the resources. So we obtain lower 
and upper limits, the value of the firm must be somewhere between those two 
extremes.”79 
Real option theory connects the choice of the governance form with a firm’s 
performance. Leiblein in 2003 made a review of already existing literature “as applied 
to decisions involving firm boundaries, the acquisition and development of resources, 
and economic performance.”80 
The real option theory is one of the emerging theories to valuate investment 
opportunities in an uncertain environment. It up to now has been applied to many fields 
of business: corporate growth, flexibility, entrepreneurial failure, joint-ventures, market 
entry and organizational governance. Also the boundaries of the approach have been 
discussed in literature. 
 
Concerning strategic management the scientific research identifies two aspects: 
First, “there are opportunity costs associated with irreversible investment under 
uncertainty.”81 Because of that the ability to defer investments under uncertainty is of 
great importance. Secondly, growth options, that are sequential investments 
opportunities of foregoing investments, have to be considered. 
Those two aspects create management flexibility. The aim must be to actively confront 
uncertainty, rather than trying to avoid it. 
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The final property is that real option theory helps “how firm-level characteristics affect 
decisions regarding organizational form.”82 As an example one could state that even if 
the demand for a given process technology is low, the potential future applications of 
this technology can positively exceed the R&D costs in the long run and eventually 
lead to a comparative advantage. A well diversified firm is more likely to act in such a 
way. 
Based on the idea of resource heterogeneity ”the real option theory indicated that 
governance choices may also be shaped by firms' unique perceptions regarding future 
value generating opportunities.”83 The real option approach lays a strong emphasis on 
risk, because the possible future cash flows are discounted and potential follow-on 
investments are taken into account. More precisely, the real option theory puts weight 
on the upside potential for profits associated with uncertainty. Firms take decisions 
subjected to their estimations. The identification of a bundle of resources forms the 
centre of real option analysis.  
 
5.4.1. Assumptions 
  
Two key assumptions underlie the real option perspective: 
 
Leiblein (2003) identified the two assumptions underlying the real option perspective: 
“The first assumption is the ability of managers to write contracts that provide the 
opportunity for follow-on investments. This assumption implies that managers possess 
a level of foresight sufficient to engage in negotiation over the price and provisions 
associated with a call option, ex ante, that will mitigate ex post bargaining costs and 
opportunities for the seller to hold-up the buyer.”84 
The second assumption depicts that it has to be possible to specify an expected future 
stream of cash flows associated with an investment. The potential future value has to be 
estimated. 
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Out of those two assumptions, one can get to the following implications: 
First the author presents the concept of Modigliani and Miller (1963), stating that the 
overall value of a company has to components: the present value of both current assets 
and expected profit from current assets. Myers (1977) argument forms the second 
implication that traditional evaluation techniques will often underestimate the value of 
the option, because managers can react flexibly to changes in the environment. 
 
5.4.2. Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
It is well understood that a real option theory needs a theory of the firm as a foundation, 
to better identify the different value drivers. Generally, the firm’s role is the most 
appropriate form of handling future’s uncertainty and protecting knowledge. 
Leiblein and Miller in 2003 elaborated a convenient overview on some of the most 
important findings in Real Option Therory, thereby including scientific discoveries of 
Bowman and Hurry (1993, definitions), Kogut (1999, Real Option Theory) and 
Trigeorgis (1996, examples). 
 
During that process three mechanisms of the real option theory that could possibly 
influence the decisions of a company have been identified: 
The first argument relies on the perception that firms are an aggregation of investment 
opportunities. Secondly, the importance of real options under high uncertainty is 
emphasized. The basic thought is that a firm can achieve higher flexibility via market 
contracting than via integrated production. “real options theory suggests market 
exchange may still be the optimal form of governance if the flexibility benefits created 
by avoiding irreversible commitments offset the cost of these more immediate 
inefficiencies.”85 The third and final argument deals with platform investments. This 
point relies on findings by Kim and Kogut (1996): “firms will be more likely to 
vertically integrate whenever the manufacturer of one product provides a secure, 
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preferential claim on the option to later develop a (potentially lucrative) related 
product.”86 
 
Leiblein (2003) presented the properties of ROA: “The Real Option approach has been 
used to generate a number of predictions regarding the potential value associated with 
investments that provide the option holder with the ability to improve performance by 
expanding into attractive markets or technologies as well as the opportunity to contain 
downside risk by deferring investment, abandoning operations, and expanding or 
contracting activities.”87 This statement again describes the ability to create future 
opportunities through investments. The easiest possibility to do so is to defer 
investment, called the option of waiting. This is an important source of flexibility. Even 
if the expected net value of an investment is positive today, it might still be valuable to 
wait even longer if expectations point to an again higher net value in future. One of the 
main dilemmas of this thesis is very well summarized: “integration will expose the firm 
to the risk of owning assets that may turn out to have little value due to changes in 
either the underlying technology or product demand. Market contracting, in contrast, 
may incur greater short-term marginal production costs but provide the firm with the 
flexibility to pursue alternative technologies in the future.”88 Real option theory 
suggests that it may be suitable to use close to market mechanisms under uncertainty to 
preserve flexibility. 
 
5.4.3. Individual Options 
 
5.4.3.1. Options to defer investment 
 
Some investments are irreversible, meaning that their future value is uncertain and that 
costs are incurred in case of full recovery. Committing resources to such options 
therefore puts more risk on the firm. The option to defer investment consequently is 
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important for flexibility purposes, as it allows the firm to wait for the arrival of new 
information. 
 
5.4.3.2. Growth Options 
 
Growth Options are also known as options to expand. They are a platform of growth in 
either yet existing lines of production or in related product markets. These options play 
an important role in the IT sector, because appropriation regimes are rather weak. 
 
5.4.3.3. Embedded Options 
 
Sharp (1991) emphasized the importance of embedded options and developed a 
decision-making process partly based on experience and managerial intuition in high-
risk environments. The option value increases with uncertainty and time. 
His framework basically rests on two assumptions: “well-informed, experienced 
managerial judgement is an excellent, practical substitute for exact option valuation; 
and that managerial judgements must be embedded in a formal decision-making 
process.”89 
One can hardly imagine an investment project that does not contain certain real options 
besides the obvious cash flow structure. After the valuation of cash flows, the option 
component of a project should be identified and evaluated. Sharp (1991) suggests three 
steps in doing so: “First, managers identify the options embedded in a given investment.  
second, they evaluate the environment and circumstances in which each might be 
exercised. Finally, managers judge whether the aggregate value of the options 
sufficiently outweighs any shortfall in the project’s cash flow value”90 
 
He additionally introduced an “option checklist”, containing the following points: 
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Identify options: At first the incremental option component has to be identified; most 
straight forward is learning that can be transferred to other sectors. Next, flexibility 
options should be identified. They are often created by excess of exact requirements for 
one certain project; the most convenient example here would be multiple sourcing. 
Analyze environmental uncertainty: “Uncertainty creates firm-specific opportunities: 
investments in which learning can be exploited and flexibility exercised”91 In the early 
90s the majority of investments in the former Soviet area had a “food-in-the-door” 
function. Investments were not aimed at short-run profits, but rather at the exploitation 
of future opportunities. Also in this context, incremental options were more important 
than flexibility options, which were not the primary source of the positive investment 
decision. 
Value project options: Assessment of real options is a very subjective process, because 
option pricing theory formulas are, due to their heavy assumptions, inapplicable and 
experience, intuition and sound judgement play a major role. What can be stated, 
however, is that an increase in uncertainty invariably leads to an increase in option 
value, that option value increases conformingly to project duration and the value of the 
option is moving between two limits, namely zero and the NPV of the best – which is 
the most profitable - alternative. 
 
5.4.3.4. Shadow Options and Option Chains 
 
Opportunities have to be recognized by decision makers, otherwise the firm can not 
profit from them. Those undiscovered opportunities are labelled “shadow options”. At 
some point in time some of those opportunities become visible and therefore 
exploitable. After an option has been struck, the effect of exercise will yield a bundle of 
new options. This process of sequential striking can be seen as an option chain. The 
ultimate goal of this sequence is to convert shadow options into real options. In the 
inserted figure, one can see a graphical overview of such an option chain: 
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Figure 8: “A typical Option Chain” Source: Bowman, E.H., Hurry, D. (1993), p. 764 
 
In the following, I want to present different research propositions to show some of 
many possible applications: 
Downside risk and optimal inertia: in this context the term “bundle of options” should 
be defined: “An organization’s bundle of options cushions the downside risk of future 
investments, strengthening its ability to expand aggressively and to withstand losses 
during the course of growth”92 Of great importance are sunk costs, because the 
previously made payment gives an incentive to the firm to hold on to these investments, 
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thereby lowering the share of new investments. This is what is understood by the term 
“investment inertia”. A zone of optimal inertia can be calculated. Certain trigger points 
are decisive (e.g. maximum loss). 
Perceived environmental uncertainty: the well-known argument that an option’s value 
increases with market volatility also holds here. If volatility is high, the company has an 
incentive to hold on to the option, because of future gains expected to be higher. In case 
of a smaller volatility, the company has an incentive of exercising the option earlier. 
What has to be mentioned is that environmental uncertainty is influenceable to some 
extent, because due to corporate learning the perceived external uncertainty can be 
diminished. According to March (1991), “the organization progresses from a phase of 
exploration to a phase of exploitation”93 
 
The size of organizational investments: one way of looking at small incremental 
investments is that they help to learn and to experiment before committing a larger 
bundle of resources. As a rule of thumb a firm uses small investments to develop 
necessary capabilities before making larger investments that are required to make 
substantial profits. This means can be seen as resembling the corporate option chain. 
The timing of organizational investments: Merton (1973) distinguished between two 
different types of options: If the underlying asset yields no income, it is optimal to hold 
the option until its maturity. Theoretically, options can have infinite times to maturity, 
but in reality the underlying opportunity at some point in time fades away. If the 
underlying asset is yielding an income, an early exercise may be optimal, however. In 
this case waiting comes at an opportunity cost. 
Hurry in 1993 established the concept of market strike signals, differentiating between 
two cases: First the signal that indicates the arrival of the opportunity. Secondly the 
expiration signal: “Thus, if the first signal merely ‘suggests’ a practical termination 
date for the option, the second signal actually ‘enforces’ it.”94 Another positive aspect 
of waiting is learning about the effects. The expiration signal is less likely to be missed, 
because decision makers tend to perceive threats more clearly than opportunities. 
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Generally, if an option is exercised very early, the performance is likely to be rather 
poor. Concerning puts one has to remark that they always carry an opportunity cost, if 
the money could have been invested more profitable elsewhere. 
 
The portfolio of options: it is vital to sharply distinguish between the terms “portfolio of 
options” and “an option on a portfolio of assets”. A portfolio of options is in existence 
if “the organization’s structure allows individual options at the business and functional 
levels of operations to be struck independently”95, whereas an option on a portfolio of 
assets prevails if “it is possible for a single decision [maker] at the top of the hierarchy 
to summarily dispose of a business.”96 It is considered to be more profitable to hold an 
portfolio of options, because corporate options are held separately, thereby increasing 
the firm’s flexibility. 
  
Four decisive theoretical themes need to be discussed from an option perspective, 
namely resource allocation, sense making, strategic positioning and learning. These 
four issues can be distinguished along two dimensions that can be seen in the graph 
below: 
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Figure 9: “Strategy Themes integrated by the Option lens” Source: Bowman, E.H., Hurry, D. (1993), p. 
772 
 
Resource allocation: deals with the efficient use of a company’s resources. 
Sense making: emphasizes the point that decisions are not rational, but rather depend on 
interpretation, experience and intuition. They form a natural decision making process. 
Learning: means acquiring knowledge and is often based on trial-and-error 
experiments. 
Strategic positioning: the basic idea is that every company wants to sustain superior 
performance in the long run. The concept of competitive advantage is primarily 
important in this context. 
 
If one integrates these four themes under the regime of option theory, one can see that 
organizational investments are always ambiguous: “Organizational investments provide 
current returns and cash flow, on the one hand, and they open up options, on the other. 
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A firm is valued as a going concern on the assumption that it will continue to invest. 
Therefore, its market value includes the value of these options. The value of the firm is 
thus the sum of earnings generated by investments in place plus the option value of 
future strategic choices.”97 According to Kester (1984), this option component, 
representing growth potential, can make up for more than 50% of a firm’s value. So-
called “latent assets” are included. 
 
A nice example was stated by Bowman and Hurry (1993): They apply the option 
theoretic approach to Research & Development, claiming that “Investment in R&D […] 
is like a bet. […] … ’R’ represents the price of the option, and the ‘D’ represents its 
strike value should the bet turn out favourably.”98 Going back to the option chain, it is 
important to say that small and large investments are strongly interrelated. 
Summarizing, the authors declared that “Options thus actually form the inimitable 
resources that give an organization its sustained performance and competitive 
advantage.”99 
 
At the end of this section I want to present some counter-intuitive findings: 
Strategy and selection: an organization is permanently exposed to changes in its 
immediate environment. The environment at some points in time offers opportunities 
that are inexistent at other points in time. A company has to position itself in an 
advantageous way today to profit from opportunities tomorrow. 
The garbage can: March and Olsen argued in 1976 that solutions exist in advance of 
problems. To draw an analogy to Bowman’s and Hurry’s (1993) model, one can view 
shadow options as solutions and opportunities as problems. 
Means consensus: to find consensus about corporate goals is less important than finding 
an agreement about the means of corporate strategy. 
The risk-return paradox: if we consider rather risk-seeking strategies like leveraged 
operations, managers tend to strike options earlier, even with insufficient information. 
There is a clear problem of asymmetric information: “In this case, because they are 
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protected by limited liability, owners gain from the upside potential of the firm’s 
investments, leaving debtors to carry the full downside risk of bankruptcy. In this 
situation, managers have an incentive to take more risks in maximizing shareholder 
wealth.”100 
 
Burger-Helmchen (2004) also laid the focus of his scientific research on shadow 
options and the option chain. He stated that the shift from a shadow to a real option 
includes some heuristics. Heuristics are commonly used in science, especially in 
business: “In using heuristics they make simplifications that allow the development of 
ideas, enable them to continue without answering all possible problems that can 
arise.”101 This evolution often contains coincidence and does not only follow a logical 
path. He then made a distinction between epistemic and practice communities 
(Cohendet and Llerena, 2003), applying it to the real option world by declaring that: 
“The passage from a shadow to a real option corresponds to the modification of the 
epistemic community into a community of practice. The type of management has also to 
change from an entrepreneur to a manager”102 
A differentiation between shadow and real options, can be seen in the below inserted 
table. 
“We determine boundaries for four variables that intervene in the real option analysis 
namely: the premium that is endured to acquire the option, the striking price for 
exercising the option, the gain if the option is exercised and the value of the option. 
Two parameters usually found in real option are omitted, the interest rate (assumed 
constant) and the time to expiration.”103 
The most important aspect of this discussion is that the value of a shadow option is 
equal to its intrinsic value plus the speculative value, that the value of a shadow option 
is only a transition point to guide real option evaluation and that overoptimistic 
analyses confuse value of shadow option with value of real option; generally, 
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competences can be obtained either through R&D (which is time consuming) or 
through acquisition (which is expensive). 
 
 
Table 6: “Cost and Value of Shadow and Real Options” Source: Burger-Helmchen, T. (2004) p. 29 
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5.4.4. Investment Timing and the Option to Wait 
 
Concerning timing of investment, Dixit (1992) argued that waiting to invest has a 
positive value, when the following conditions are present: investment is linked to sunk 
costs, uncertainty prevails, additional information arrives gradually and the investment 
opportunity will not disappear. Nonetheless, there is an obvious trade-off: The question 
is when an investment opportunity is sufficiently favourable to enter into. The same 
applies again to questions of disinvestment. So far, the argument simply said that 
“waiting has a positive value, but not whether this value is typically large enough to 
have a significant impact on investment and disinvestment decisions.”104 
Within his regime, Dixit (1992) undertook the following assumptions: Future revenues 
are not perfectly predictable; hence they can only be estimated. Revenues increase or 
decrease by a fixed percentage per time unit (to be more precise it follows a geometric 
Brownian motion). For simplicity, the trend rate of revenues is set equal to zero. The 
goal is to maximize the present value of profits and investors are risk neutral. 
 
There are some concepts that require closer examination: 
The effect of waiting: If it is possible for an investor to wait and reassess the decision 
later, the following can be observed: “waiting for a certain amount of time enables an 
investor to avoid the downside risk in revenues over that interval, while realizing the 
upside potential. […] On the other hand, the cost of waiting is the sacrifice of the profit 
flow over the period of waiting.”105 If a certain, exogenously determinable trigger is 
reached, investment is finally carried out.  
The optimal policy: Now the investment trigger is no longer given externally, it has to 
be chosen internally. Purely conceptually, the trigger should be “pushed” as far as 
possible in order to maximize value. The problem associated with this tendency is that a 
speculative bubble would be formed: “the value of waiting would be high because the 
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prospect of reaching an even higher R [= revenues] would offer an even higher value of 
waiting, with no actual investment ever in sight.”106 
The importance of option values: Most generally, when there is little uncertainty, also 
the value of waiting is low. 
  
This above stated model is oversimplified due to its very rigid assumptions. For 
instance, considering a geometric Brownian motion implies that uncertainty is roughly 
symmetric when looking at the trend. This does however not correspond to reality, as 
Bernanke’s (1983) bad news principle stated: “the downside risk is the primary force 
governing optimal investment decisions when waiting is possible.”107 Moreover, when 
there are many competitors in the market, waiting may not be longer optimal, because 
there is a contest for this scarce opportunity. Lastly, information between firms may 
simply differ. 
What happens if a firm suffers operating losses from a project? In this case temporary 
suspension will be carried out, if possible. Here the option to wait influences the 
abandonment decision: “The gross revenue has to fall some way below the operating 
cost before abandonment becomes optimal.”108 Interestingly, the possibility of 
abandonment directly influences the entry trigger:”if abandonment is costly […] then 
the entry trigger is higher; firms are more cautious in undertaking a venture they may 
have to abandon later at a cost.”109 
 
Also management culture matters a lot. If we look at the economic situation in the 90s, 
among US managers, in comparison to their Japanese colleagues, short-term thinking 
was prevalent, leading to the phenomenon that US firms tended to abandon projects 
after short periods of losses, while Japanese firms were more reluctant to leave such 
projects, if there was some potential for future improvement. One argument for these 
findings was the lifetime employment system in Japan; in such an environment labour 
is quasi fixed. 
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The introduction of competition leads to a new assumption: uncertainty is exogenously 
given to all the active, price-taking firms. Here the market price of a product will 
oscillate between two prices: if the upper limit is reached, new firms will enter the 
market and prevent an even further rise. If the lower limit is reached, firms will enter 
into bankruptcy and therefore exit the market, preventing an even further decline. 
 
McDonald and Siegel (1986) also wrote about optimal investment timing when a 
company faces an irreversible project, such as building a plant. Their goal was to 
establish an optimal decision guideline under the assumption that investors are well 
diversified and risk-averse. They explained the prospect of their scientific paper in the 
following way: “In this paper we explore the practical importance of the value of 
waiting to invest, assuming that investment timing decisions are made by risk-averse 
investors who hold well-diversified portfolios.”110 Their model is based on the option to 
wait – i.e. timing considerations are important. 
A firm facing an investment opportunity bases its decision on discounted expected cash 
flows. The future value of the project is exposed to uncertainty and follows a stochastic 
movement. In addition, there is a problem of “optimal scrapping”: “In general, it will 
be optimal to scrap only when the selling price exceeds the project value by a positive 
amount.”111 
 
As with financial options, an increase in the variance leads to an augmentation of the 
maximum possible gain, while leaving the maximum possible loss unchanged. 
Similarly, a decrease in the correlation will increase the option value as well. Investors 
are well diversified and because of that they only require compensation for the 
systematic risk part of investment projects. An increase in the systematic risk 
component leads to a decrease of the option value. A risk premium is an additional 
earned unit in proportion to the underlying asset’s risk. The optimal decision rule 
stipulates the following: “it is optimal to invest when the opportunity cost from not 
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installing the project equals or exceeds the opportunity cost saved by deferring 
installation.”112 
 
5.4.5. Technological Platforms and Technology Positioning 
 
Kim and Kogut (1996) discussed the formation of so-called technological platforms and 
the derivation of technologies. One aim is to acquire know-how that is applicable to a 
vast range of market opportunities and thereby achieving competitive knowledge. “The 
authors propose that a firm’s experience in platform technologies increases the 
likelihood of diversification when environmental opportunities are favorable.”113 As a 
sample this paper considered 176 semiconductor start-up companies. The most 
important finding was that diversification depends on two things, namely on 
technological experience and on market opportunities. 
 
 “Developing competence in new but broadbased technological skills is an investment 
in a platform to participate, by a process of expansion and diversification, in the 
evolution of future opportunities.”114 In order to expand under favourable market 
conditions, it is especially important to accumulate experimental know-how. Such 
opportunities provide an option to diversify into new markets. Technologies differ in 
their usefulness to diversify in new fields: they can, on the one hand, be a starting point 
for the development of new resources and, on the other hand, be limited to certain 
applications. One has to distinguish between the above described experience and the 
timing of diversification. The authors found strong support for the opinion that certain 
subfields serve as platforms for the entry into other market segments. 
Their findings can be summarized in the following way: First, the stronger markets 
grow, the more likely firms will diversify into new markets and secondly 
“Diversification is the outcome of temporally ordered decisions to adapt or acquire 
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knowledge for exploitation of new markets”115 and diversification should follow a rather 
broad direction. 
 
McGrath (1997) also examined technology positioning projects and how real option 
theory can be applied to these projects. There are certain differences between 
technology options and financial options, but also striking similarities: First, the price 
of a technology option is the cost of development; secondly, there exists an underlying 
right to commercialize this technology; thirdly, exercise, i.e. commercialization, 
involves further investment and fourthly “the option is like an American call: it can be 
exercised or traded any time after technology development is completed, or not at all. 
Completing commercialization creates another asset, which is the underlying right of 
the firm to extract returns from the exploitation of the now-commercialized 
technology.”116 
There is another special similarity between financial options and technology options: 
the volatility of financial options behaves in a way comparable to the variance of a 
technology option. One big difference is that a technology option typically inherits 
several embedded options. Therefore potential amplification opportunities have to be 
taken into account. Note that these embedded options are highly individual – they can 
only be exercised successfully in the context of the individual firm. 
 
McGrath (1997) also gave a numerical example: imagine that the development of a new 
technology will cost $10 million. The NPV of the commercialization costs will be 
either $100 million or $50 million. A favourable regulation will result in a NPV of 
revenues of $180 million, unfavourable regulation in a NPV of revenues of $0. Both 
events have a probability of 50%. 
Expected value of the project: NPV method 
0,5 * (- 100 + 0,5 * 180 + 0,5 * 0) + 0,5 * (- 50 + 0,5 * 180 + 0,5 * 0) -10 = $5.000.000 
The NPV criterion suggests immediate investment. 
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If the firm waits for the pending regulation to be truncated, uncertainty might be solved. 
The company’s discount rate is 10% and the issue will be solved in one year’s time. 
The result shows that the option value increases: 
0,9 * {0,5 * [0,5 * (180-100) + 0,5 * (180-150) – 10] + 0,5 * (- 10)} = $38.250.000 
 
Figure 10: Technology Positioning Option Decision Tree, Source: McGrath, R.G. (1997), p. 978 
 
Looking at this example, one can say that “uncertainty both constraints the positive 
potential of the project and establishes an expiration date for options on the 
technology.”117 To minimize uncertainty the company could for example engage in 
lobbying activities. In this sense the firm may find it advantageous to rather invest in 
legal boundary conditions than in the technology itself. 
The value of waiting must not be underestimated and regarding technology options a 
good closing statement might be that “This motivates a view of technology that does not 
exist in isolation but, rather, is one element in an overall strategy to capture rents, 
clearly embedded in a competitive and institutional context.”118 
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5.4.6. Restructuring Profile 
 
Hurry (1993) introduced the concept of restructuring profiles, which is a tool to carry 
out strategic choices. He thereby examined the linkages between US and Japanese firms 
with respect to their portfolio choices. “Japanese – US strategic linkages create choices 
in the form of a call option on portfolio reconfiguration for the Japanese firm, and a 
put option on financial restructuring for its US partner.”119 These developments were 
initiated by the dramatic pace of globalization. There are two different forms of 
restructuring, namely portfolio and financial restructuring. 
Also the role of global restructuring has to be analyzed. Hoskisson and Turk (1990) 
defined corporate restructuring in the following way: “Corporate restructuring has 
been defined as a major change in strategy.”120 It is an empirical fact that simultaneous 
restructuring occurs, when firms are interlinked in the market. The purpose of 
restructuring again is value-maximization. 
 
According to Myers (1977), the value of a firm consists of the firm’s assets and the 
firm’s future opportunities. Bowman and Hurry (1993) stipulated that future growth 
options result in a bundle of options for strategic choice. The underlying logic is the 
following: “The option bundle contains two primary options: calls (i.e. future strategic 
choices to invest, or expand the portfolio) and puts (i.e. choices to divest, or contract). 
A firm expands by ‘striking’ calls. A firm contracts, and generates cash for financial 
restructuring, by striking puts.”121 The final definition of Hurry (1993) said that 
“Global restructuring is the strategic process of striking options to capture 
complementary opportunities, across global firms, for changes in the portfolio scope 
and financing.”122 The resulting dimensions are calls, puts and the time to maturity, so 
we are moving in a real option world. 
Restructuring patterns in Japan and in the US were – and still are - very different. There 
are vast differences between management style instruments. Japanese companies tend 
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to cushion themselves against downside risk, they generally carry out their investments 
in a more aggressive way and they usually favour holding on to investments for a 
longer time span. In contrast, US firms “largely hold an option on a portfolio 
businesses”123, as Fligstein (1990) put it; therefore they only posses one strategic 
choice. Under the typical Japanese keiretsu system, “the group holds a bundle of 
business-level and functional-level options”.124 
 
Next, both global strategic interrelationships as well as portfolio restructuring are 
inspected: 
The restructuring effect of strategic linkages: If two firms are interdependent to a great 
extent and one of the firms is currently in a weak condition, the stronger firm is forced 
to help the weaker to reinforce. Those strategic linkages also have a strong effect on 
resource dependencies. Within these strategic alliance-like relationships, shadow 
options may be exposed to the counterparty, even if the companies are operating in 
different industries. 
The dynamics of linked restructuring: Japanese firms regularly carry out their strategy 
in the following stages: First, recognize a shadow option, secondly make a small 
investment to secure the option, thirdly hold the option until a favourable market signal 
arrives and fourthly strike the option. 
Hamel (1991) defined global alliances in the following way: “Global alliances are 
transition mechanisms that allow firms to internalize their partner’s skills.”125 Inside 
such alliances, one firm, in our context typically the US firm, at some point in time 
transmits a recognition signal. This kind of signal permits the other firm to acquire a 
call option on future expansion. Nevertheless, companies have to think about 
contingencies that could potentially erase their option, such as competitor’s action, 
changes in the ownership structure, financial collapse or governmental intervention. 
What undoubtedly is worth reasoning is that from the identification of a shadow option 
to proper exercise of the option several years can easily pass. Also the degree of 
competition (i.e. stabile or instable) has to be taken into account. To go back to our 
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example, the average Japanese firm’s portfolio is likely to widen substantially in 
comparison to the average US firm, whose portfolio probably will be contracted. Still 
“the overall restructuring time spans will be asymmetrical (since firms typically hold 
many linkages simultaneously.)”126 The creation of an industry-wide call option is also 
possible. 
  
When discussing concepts of financial restructuring and strategic linkages, also 
motivational aspects have to be addressed. Without a consensus between the parties an 
option cannot be struck. The firm that possesses the put option, so in our case mostly 
the US firm, intends to seek an early strike, because of competition, possible financial 
distress and to earn capital gains to enable financial restructuring. Coffee (1988) and 
Boot (1991) both argued that, due to information asymmetries, “In a stable corporate 
control market, managers tend to overinvest in expansion, while unstable conditions 
induce the opposite effect.”127 The result should be the realignment of incentives on 
both managerial and owner side. Brennan (1990) defines a latent asset as a unique 
opportunity for a company to expand. The value of such an asset is exposed to changes 
over time and Japanese firms are usually bidding rather high for one of the following 
reasons: either because of the degree of opportunity cost if the bid would be rejected, or 
because the appearance of a rival bidder leads to an auction-like process. This 
phenomenon is labelled “Japanese premium”. 
 
One reason why firms often choose to cooperate is that they are more likely to gain a 
comparative advantage. All those developments have to be discussed on basis of a 
globalized economy. Concerning strategy, Hurry (1993) opined that “given bounded 
rationality, strategy may be viewed as a combination of economic logic and managerial 
intuition.”128 Therefore also cognitive aspects play an important role in this context. 
Because future opportunities are yet unknown, the resources have to be allocated in a 
mostly intuitive way. Shadow options allow for future competitive advantages. 
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6. Real Option Analysis on Outsouring 
 
 
6.1. Outsourcing – main concepts 
  
The term “outsourcing” first appeared in literature as late as 1982. It basically depicts 
the practice of one company providing a service or good for another company. An 
important issue is the differentiation between “subcontracting” and “outsourcing”. 
Subcontracting “typically refers to the situation where the contractor "procures an item 
or service that is normally capable of economic production in the con- tractor's own 
facilities and that requires the contractor to make specifications available to the 
subcontractor (Day 1956)."129 whereas outsourcing “refers to the special case where 
the contractor has no in-house production capability and is dependent on the 
subcontractor for the entire product volume.”130 
 
Billington, Johnson and Triantis (2002) looked at emerging business models: also in the 
IT sector a clear trend towards outsourcing was observable. Using outsourcing 
agreements permits the company to pool its risks and to realize economies of scale. 
Those new business models involve significant amounts of risk at the beginning; the 
objective is to achieve a comparative advantage. Firms need to participate in those new 
business models to remain competitive: “significant investments in staffing, 
professional development, processes, and infrastructure to execute these activities not 
only can be justified, but may prove necessary to compete.”131 Nevertheless, one must 
never forget the associated risks, which could easily overcompensate for the realized 
benefits. 
Looking at the hype accompanying outsourcing, it is important to highlight the main 
disadvantages of vertical disintegration: On the one hand the control within the supply 
chain is clearly lowered; on the other hand the direct access to information is reduced. 
                                                 
129 van Mieghem, J. (1999), p. 954 
130 van Mieghem, J. (1999), p. 954 
131 Billington, C., Johnson, B., Triantis, A. (2002), p. 40 
Real Option Analysis and its Application on Outsourcing                                     74 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
This can diminish the expected gains of a sourcing relationship. Concerning flexibility 
the authors again drew an analogy to options by saying: “an option’s value reflects the 
quality of the available information about the underlying asset insofar as this 
determines the ability to exercise the option effectively.”132 
 
6.1.1. Core Competencies 
 
Firms decide to outsource some activities in order to concentrate on their core 
competencies and to increase their competitiveness. The act of outsourcing literally any 
activity but the core can lead to the following benefits: Returns on internal resources 
are maximized, highly protected and well elaborated core competencies serve as a 
barrier to possible market entrants, access to the expertise and the contingents of an 
external supplier and higher flexibility, because in general risks are diversified and 
investments are lowered. Famous examples of successful companies that carry out a lot 
of sourcing activities are Nike and Apple; decisive questions are what a core 
competency is, which activities should be outsourced and which should be kept in-
house and the estimation of possible risks and benefits associated with an outsourcing 
relationship. 
 
Alvarez and Stenbacka (2007) argued that a firm needs to keep its core competencies 
in-house so as to avoid becoming too vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour of the 
supplier. “Within the framework of the present model partial outsourcing follows from 
an optimal dynamic tradeoff between a current reversible mode of in-house production 
and an irreversible organizational redesign with an option of marginal cost 
savings.”133  
Hilmer and Quinn (1994) discussed the term “core competency” and compiled the 
following findings answering the question what a core competency would be: 
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Skill or knowledge sets, not products or functions: a valid example is internal skills – 
maybe acquired through learning – or certain management systems. This expertise has 
to create a maintainable competitive advantage in order to be a core competency. Of 
special importance in this context are skills that connect traditional functions. 
Flexible, long-term platforms – capable of adopting or evolution: Here flexibility is the 
key to success – managers must not focus too narrowly on few products. The company 
should identify those sectors that can be expected to be highly valued by customers in 
the long run. Trends have to be reassessed constantly. 
Limited in numbers: Without any doubt, a company can not reach excellence in every 
single activity – the secret is to concentrate on just a few. 
Unique sources of leverage in the value chain: Hilmer and Quinn (1994) stipulate that 
“Effective strategies seek out places where there are market imperfections or 
knowledge gaps that the company is uniquely qualified to fill.”134 
Areas where the company can dominate: The key to dominance is effectiveness. 
Benchmarking has to be implemented at every stage of the value chain in order to stay 
competitive. 
Elements important to customers in the long run: Customers needs have to be analyzed 
steadily. 
Embedded in the organization’s systems: The firm has to establish a sound corporate 
culture based on a good reputation that outlives single successful products. 
Preeminence: Once a core competency has been identified, the company must do 
everything to maintain its superior position. As the authors write, a strategic block has 
to be erected to protect these most essential skills. Furthermore, “as a company’s 
preeminence in selected fields grows, its knowledge-based core competencies become 
ever harder to overtake. Knowledge bases tend to grow exponentially in value with 
investment and experience.”135 Core competencies basically offer long-term advantages 
in the market environment, as opposed by peripheral activities, which are not essential 
to the company’s success. 
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Concerning strategic outsourcing, if we look at the case of totally efficient supplier 
markets, it can be argued that an entity would be ready to outsource literally every 
activity except its core competencies. Management must not forget about transaction 
costs associated with outsourcing, namely searching, contracting and controlling costs 
and has to answer the following questions: Is it possible to obtain a competitive 
advantage in this outsourced activity? To what extent is the company vulnerable if the 
relationship should fail? How can the trade-off between control and flexibility resolved 
in the best way? 
The main problem is to reach an equilibrium between independence and incentives on 
the supplier’s side and control and security on the contractor’s side. This interrelation 
between vulnerability and advantages can we very well seen in the inserted graph: 
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Figure 11: “Competitive Advantage VS. Strategic Vulnerability” Source: Hilmer, F.G., Quinn, J.B. 
(1994), p. 48 
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Next we should focus to the concept of competitive edge. A useful technique in that 
field is the so-called “best-in-class” worldwide benchmarking. Companies regularly fail 
to identify such suppliers, because their focus is often too limited to domestic markets. 
Also transaction costs must be measured by management. Two tendencies are that 
management often tends to underestimate backup costs; on the other hand there exists 
one big advantage that is often overlooked: the increase in executive time, because 
peripheral activities no longer need attention. 
 “When there are many suppliers[…]a potential buyer is unlikely to be more efficient 
than the best available supplier”136 One problem here is a possible lack of information, 
another the fear of opportunistic behaviour by the supplier. 
Managers have a wide range of options how to form and control a sourcing 
relationship. Inside this vast range of options, there “are opportunities for developing 
special incentives or more complex oversight contracts to balance intermediate levels 
of vulnerability against more moderate prospects for competitive edge.”137 The range of 
sourcing options can be seen in the following graph: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: “Range of Outsourcing Options” Source: Hilmer, F.G., Quinn, J.B. (1994), p. 50 
 
There is a trade-off between flexibility and control. Again, there is a big variety of 
sourcing arrangements, resting on the needed flexibility-control relation. The vital task 
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is how to optimally structure these relationships. Hilmer and Quinn (1994) stated that 
“specialized suppliers can often produce higher value added at lower cost for that 
activity than almost any integrated company.”138 The spectrum of sourcing 
relationships can be seen below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: “Potential Contract Relationships” Source: Hilmer, F.G., Quinn, J.B. (1994), p. 50 
 
With respect to sourcing arrangements, management always has to assess strategic risks 
and benefits. The main problem is the following: ”Too often companies look at 
outsourcing as a means to lower only short-term direct costs. However, through 
                                                 
138 Hilmer, F.G., Quinn, J.B., “Strategic Outsourcing”, Sloan Management Rev. Summer; 35,4 (1994), p. 51 
Full 
Ownership 
Partial 
Ownership 
Joint 
Development 
Retainer 
Long-term 
Contract 
Call Option 
Short-term 
Contract 
High 
High Low
Low 
Control Need 
Fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
 N
ee
d 
Real Option Analysis and its Application on Outsourcing                                     79 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
strategic outsourcing, companies can lower their long-term capital investments and 
leverage their key competencies significantly.”139 
The most important strategic benefits of outsourcing are greater flexibility, reduction of 
design-cycle times, diversification of company’s risk across many suppliers and 
exploitation of new innovative areas. Historically, since the 60s, strategic outsourcing 
has increased dramatically, whereas the average firm size has decreased. The main 
motivation for this development has been the desire to leverage internal technical 
capabilities. 
Looking at those benefits, one has to keep various strategic risks in mind: 
Loss of critical skills or developing the wrong skills: The main problem is loss of 
internal corporate strategic flexibility. Citing an example: “the buying company had lost 
the skills it needed to reenter manufacture and could not prevent its suppliers from 
either assisting competitors or entering downstream markets on their own.”140 
Loss of cross-functional skills: If activities are kept in-house, the firm might benefit 
from unexpected insights due to internal collaboration. These cross-functional benefits 
become less likely, the more activities are outsourced. In addition, the relationship has 
to be rather close in order to ensure sound evaluation by the buyer. 
Loss of control over the supplier: This can happen when there is a serious mismatch 
between the parties’ priorities. Suppliers that behave opportunistically might enter 
directly into the market with their accumulated expertise to compete with the 
contractor. Another problem is the possible diffusion of knowledge through selling 
knowledge to competitors. Many large companies nowadays have very sophisticated 
evaluation techniques. Management has to cope with greater scale and diversity 
concerning outsourcing, but this often comes at benefits: “many companies have found 
that they actually improve their knowledge base through strategic outsourcing.”141 
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6.1.2. Partial Outsourcing 
 
Alvarez and Stenbacka (2007)) described partial outsourcing in the following way: 
“optimal sourcing decision maximize the option value associated with 
subcontracting.142 
Shy and Stenbacka (2005) established a framework to explain outsourcing decisions 
with many required inputs. An example for such practice would be the mobile phone 
industry, where literally thousands of components are subcontracted. A trade-off exists 
between saving costs, for instance due to lower wage levels, and the costs of 
monitoring that inevitably arise. Therefore some components will be more effectively 
produced in-house, although production might be cheaper if the activity would be 
vertically disintegrated. The effects of partial outsourcing, id est when only a certain 
proportion of components are produced externally, have to be measured. In such a 
context, the boundaries of the firm have to be taken into account and concepts such as 
transaction costs, incomplete contracts and asset specificity have to be examined. More 
precisely, Shy and Stenbacka (2005) examined an oligopolistic market situation, where 
many inputs – not only one input, as in many other models – are required. 
A reasonable argument indicates that diminishing advantage in production applies to 
technologically sophisticated components. Therefore a manufacturer tends to produce 
those high-tech components in-house. Monitoring costs arise, because external 
production lines have to be managed and coordinated. Important to mention, 
monitoring costs are independent from the scale of production. 
 
Another decisive implication is that “consumers’ willingness to pay exceeds the final-
good’s unit production cost even when no inputs are subcontracted (hence unit cost is 
at its maximal level).”143 The basis of the firm’s production decisions are the formerly 
chosen organizational modes. Outsourcing is promoted with intensified product market 
competition, even though monitoring costs increase. 
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Also the duopoly case is worth investigating. Here the firm’s respond directly to 
decisions of the rival firm – often in the opposite way. If one firm decides to reduce its 
amount of outsourcing, for instance, the rival entity will increase its outsourcing ratio. 
Furthermore, again looking at the duopoly case, the outsourcing decision does not 
depend on the degree of product market competition. Outsourcing decisions can be 
regarded as being strategic substitutes: “[It] captures the intuitive idea that the firms 
have a strategic incentive to differentiate their production modes from one another.”144 
 
One can also imagine a different production mode, where market participants are 
manufacturing differentiated products. Now companies engage in price competition. 
Under this new regime, entities are indifferent what heterogeneous components to 
outsource and which to produce in-house. “Therefore, the outsourcing decisions are 
strategic substitutes independently of whether competition in the market for the final 
goods takes place with respect to prices or quantities.”145 
 
6.1.3. Equilibrium Models 
 
6.1.3.1. Industry Equilibrium 
 
Grossman and Helpman (2002) established an equilibrium model where the 
organization of the company is created endogenously. Inputs are specialized and there 
are two types of firms: first, vertically integrated firms who produce the goods they 
need in-house, but are facing higher governance costs and secondly specialized firms 
who are searching for a partner, which leads to searching costs, but then again lower 
production costs. 
 
The decision to make or buy is one of the most fundamental questions a company faces. 
Organizational design is the keyword and these corporate configurations can be very 
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different even within the same sector of an industry. Between decisions of firms exists a 
strong interrelationship. Grossman and Helpman (2002) developed a model, in which 
“integration and outsourcing are treated as equilibrium phenomena.”146 In addition, 
they emphasized on a “trade-off between the costs of running a larger and less 
specialized organization and costs that arise from search frictions and imperfect 
contracting.”147 The two possible ways to produce final goods are vertical integration 
and specialization. 
One version relies on the assumption that inputs have to be exactly tailored to a pre-
specified final good. Therefore the supplier can only sell its intermediate product to one 
single manufacturer. There are fixed costs of entering the market and fixed search costs 
and inputs have to be of high quality. A vertically integrated firm is yet exposed to 
additional fixed costs, namely market entry costs, production design costs and corporate 
governance costs. Contracts are incomplete; therefore market participants experience a 
lack of verifiability. 
 
A serious obstacle is the potential hold-up problem. This kind of difficulty arises, 
because the component producer tailors his products to the very particular final good of 
the manufacturer. Because of that, this input has no value to anyone else but the 
manufacturer, which gives the final producer a substantial degree of bargaining power: 
he can simply refuse to accept the intermediate goods, until the price is sufficiently low. 
This, in turn, gives firms an incentive to vertically integrate in order to get rid of the 
hold-up problem. 
Note that if goods are nearly perfect substitutes, the industry sector is highly 
competitive; on the other hand, if goods are very distinct, the manufacturer enjoys 
monopoly power. Looking at sensitivity, it can be declared that ”an increase in the 
elasticity of substitution increases the relative viability of outsourcing.”148 
 
Also the distribution of bargaining power has to be taken into account when thinking of 
outsourcing. The sustainability of the equilibrium depends on the bargaining power of 
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the intermediate producer: if it is either too high or too low, the industry equilibrium 
will not be consistent. A vital question is why different modes of organization are in 
existence at all. One way to explain this is that the required level of demand depends on 
the absolute number of firms entering the market. 
  
If intermediate products are not fully tailored, extra labour is required to meet 
individual purposes. Input specificity now is more important than before. Under these 
circumstances outside options can make a difference, when potential partners meet to 
negotiate terms of transaction. A second market is created, because technology is more 
flexible than before. Both sides now have the possibility to find another partner if initial 
negotiations should fail. Furthermore, the degree of specialization is determined 
endogenously. An increase with respect to specialization enhances expected profits but 
simultaneously higher specialization implies lower value in the secondary market. 
The most important concluding statement confirms that firms face a trade-off: “We 
have modelled a firm’s ‘make or buy’ decision as a trade-off between the transaction 
costs that stem from search and incomplete contracts on the one hand and the extra 
governance costs associated with vertical integration on the other.”149 A company has 
to be very careful which organizational mode to choose, because its market 
opportunities are dependent on this decision. 
 
 
6.2. Analogies to other Networking Forms 
 
6.2.1. Joint Ventures 
 
Kogut (1991) discussed that joint ventures should be seen as options to expand. The 
importance of market signals was emphasized. There are certain hazards with respect to 
acquisition decisions after a joint venture – a temporal agreement – has reached its end. 
The statistical results “indicate that unexpected growth in the product market increases 
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the likelihood of acquisition; unexpected shortfalls in product shipments have no effect 
on the likelihood of dissolution. This asymmetry in the results strongly supports the 
interpretation of joint ventures as options to expand.”150 
Inside a joint venture it might be argued that the partner also places a bet on future 
market developments. Costs and benefits are shared; therefore joint ventures represent 
an attractive option to expand in risky markets. The special problem associated with 
joint ventures is that exercising the option requires further capital commitments, 
thereby urging the need of renegotiations. “The exploration of the link in the timing of 
the acquisition of joint ventures and of the exercise of the option to expand is the focus 
of the following empirical investigation.”151 In a real option sense joint ventures are a 
possible way of both exploiting and buffering uncertainty. 
At first, the concepts of real options in this very specific context shall be explained: in 
our framework real options are the right to buy and sell equity in the joint venture. As 
stated above, when it is decided to exercise the option, one party is likely to divest of 
the joint venture, because the value added arising from exercise of the real option to 
expand to one entity might be very different from the value added to another entity. 
These are differences in option valuations due to “potential spill-over effects of the 
venture's technology complement the product portfolio of one partner more than the 
other.”152 
 
Therefore joint ventures can be interpreted as being real options: there are two extremes 
in our framework: In the first case, it is valuable to wait with investments, because it 
pays off before committing more resources. In the second case, investment 
commitments are necessary to retain the right to exercise the option to expand in future. 
What is important to emphasize is that the financial burden of establishing a joint 
venture is sometimes not only dividing the overall sum, but reducing it, because total 
investment costs can be lowered due to complementary skills. The motivation divesting 
is the realization of capital gains or the absence of additional technology to launch a 
market product. 
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Arguably one of the most delicate issues when thinking about options is the timing of 
exercise. In our joint venture context exercising means acquiring the venture. It 
represents a long call option; consequently, “acquisition is justified only when the 
perceived value to the buyer is greater than the exercise price.”153 There are mainly 
two reasons for exercise: First, if further investments are not made, the future cash 
flows would be inevitably lost. Secondly, if capitalization needs to be increased, 
normally renegotiations are required, often leading to termination of the joint venture. 
To buy the partner out of the venture is common business practice, because 
opportunities are perceived in different ways. In the spirit of this argument, Kogut 
(1991) set up the hypothesis that “The venture will be acquired when its valuation 
exceeds the base rate forecast.”154 
In our framework a special market valuation problem arises, because there are no 
prevalent markets that would indicate changes in the value of the option. It is 
practically impossible to collect objective data. Parameters vary over time and 
decisions are contingent on estimates. The motivations for forming a joint venture may 
be heterogeneous as well. Besides of developing an option to expand in new markets 
also the sheer benefits of sharing assets in the current use could be decisive. A further 
property of joint ventures is that “a joint venture serves as a vehicle of managerial and 
technological learning.”155 
 
The author’s statistical results show that the hypothesis is confirmed: joint ventures are 
regularly used as an intermediate stage to complete acquisition. Concerning 
governance, an interesting result is that “a decision by managers whether to acquire or 
divest the joint venture is more significantly sensitive to annual departures from a long-
term trend than to short-term indices of industry growth.”156 Management decisions 
therefore are “cued” by market signals and acquisitions often occur when an industry is 
performing superior with respect to historical trends. Those decisions are imperatively 
based on managerial interpretations – especially the recognition that short term market 
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fluctuations may be outliers is often misjudged. One concluding statement is that “Once 
the capital is committed, the downside risk is low, especially if there is a market for the 
acquisition of the assets and operating costs are not high. The selling of the venture 
means that one firm puts a higher value on the assets; it does not mean the venture is 
unprofitable.”157 This strongly supports the opinion that joint ventures can be designed 
as real options. 
 
Citing a closing assertion: “This article has investigated the proposition that joint 
ventures are designed as options that are exercised through a divestment and 
acquisition decision.”158 
 
 
6.2.2. Supply Chain Management 
 
6.2.2.1. Supply Chain Management in High Technology 
 
The IT sector is a market segment that is said to be highly volatile and risky with 
respect to both supply and demand, where uncertainty is prevalent. Now the task is to 
gain from – and not only adjust to – such uncertainty: “such uncertainty is increasingly 
recognized as a key source of comparative advantage and shareholder value.”159 IT 
sector risk management processes that were formerly almost exclusively used in 
financial industries now become more important, namely the active handling of the 
balance between assets and liabilities. Risk in institutions such as banks has been 
handled as follows: “These banks design especially tailored optionbased products and 
strategies to retail and institutional clients that exploit the presence of uncertainty in 
financial markets, and use quantitative models for measuring and hedging their 
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residual risk exposures.”160 Companies in the IT sector developed appropriate 
approaches to manage uncertainty. 
 
One can identify four characteristics that are typical for high technology industries: 
There are significant risk exposures (short product life cycles, rapid technological 
change, etc.), especially risky are demand for products and supply for inputs, large 
expenditures on research and development and manufacturing capacity have to be made 
and vertical disintegration has led to a higher need for procurement and sales contracts. 
Nevertheless, the later cited results will largely be applicable to other industries as well. 
The main task is to develop a portfolio of real options available to the company, whose 
value depends on both the timing and the diversity of alternatives. A special focus will 
be put on contractual options that can be embedded into procurement contracts. 
The basic question is how to exploit uncertainty: “Uncertainty can be exploited to 
create value if a company can find ways to mitigate ‘downside’ risk while preserving 
the ‘upside’ effects of uncertainty.”161 Real Options have to be created at an amount 
below their current value. If this task can be carried out successfully, the risk exposure 
of the firm is reduced and at the same time the shareholders value is augmented, 
because of the now lower cost structure. 
 
There are two key dimensions for real options: time and scope. Concerning timing, 
Billington, Johnson and Triantis (2002) stated that “[speaking of] the temporal 
dimension, options are created by postponing investment or operating decisions in 
order to make them in as “informed” a way as possible.”162 As we know that argument 
follows the logic that an option with a longer time to maturity is preferable to an option 
with a shorter time to maturity. Concerning scope one has to think about an array of 
choices. The objective is to find the alternative that gives the best result, i.e. 
maximizing future return. To put it in technical terms: “A company will continue to 
increase the number of future alternatives until the derived expected value from an 
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additional alternative no longer exceeds the associated cost.”163 The redesign of the 
real option portfolio is implemented in response to uncertainty in both supply and 
demand. These real options are classified in three different categories: sales, 
manufacturing and procurement. 
 
First, we should take a look at sales options. The most basic ambition associated with 
sales is to augment the product palette for the consumer. One possibility to realize this 
is through a build-to-order model, where the consumer himself specifies the desired 
configuration. With such an implementation the company can erase a lot of uncertainty 
by postpone procurement of the components, because supply can be synchronized with 
the precisely known demand. Under these conditions, where “just-in-time” logistics are 
dominant, inventory becomes almost obsolete. From an real option point of view, 
inventory can be seen as: ”a form of insurance, a costly real option that pays off in 
periods of high demand, but expires worthless in periods of low demand.”164 In this 
case volatility basically equals the volatility of demand. The cost of inventory is 
directly positively correlated with the volatility of demand. 
Furthermore, prices can be adjusted dynamically, depending on demand and 
availability. The definition of the term “spread” in this environment is also provided: 
“The spread is the difference between the price at which the company is able to sell a 
product with a particular configuration and the cost of delivering the product.”165 
 
Secondly, manufacturing options have to be taken into account. A large product variety 
that results from a manufacturing process is primarily value-increasing. Also here the 
above presented concept of inventory comes into play: a huge inventory can be 
effectively avoided by exact staging of the manufacturing processes. A special real 
option is “dual response manufacturing”. Flexibility is the most important factor here. 
The dual response manufacturing concept can be explained as follows: “If demand 
exceeds this base level, additional capacity with lower fixed but higher variable costs 
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can then be brought on to manage such short-term fluctuations.”166 There are other 
methods of balancing capacities, such as using similar processes internationally. The 
organization can combine the efforts of several production facilities to cut down on lead 
time, for instance. To get used to the terminology in the option world, I want to cite the 
following statement: “the maturity date of the company’s options to produce can be 
extended to make it closer to the sales date. While the exercise price (cost of 
production) may be higher, this may be more than offset by the option’s longer maturity 
date, particularly when uncertainty is great.”167 
 
Thirdly, I want to turn to procurement options. When we are thinking about 
procurement options, we largely have to consider embedded contractual options. This 
form of agreement is called structured contract. By using such options, a rather rigid 
long-term contractual agreement can be made more flexible by inducing short-term 
clauses. Those embedded options are understandably target of negotiations and 
therefore rest on the relative bargaining power. It is an interplay between the value for 
the purchaser and the cost for the supplier of the flexibility option in question. A huge 
problem associated with procurement options was the underdeveloped and illiquid spot 
market in technological components, but the situation keeps improving. A final 
important aspect can be identified in the case of “overbuying”, which is when a 
company chooses to buy more than its actual demand, because of volume discounts. 
The arising question is how to formalize those findings to define a proper risk 
management. When we reconsider the ways of exploiting uncertainty, one can sum up 
by stating that “The various supply chain options introduced above focus primarily on 
creating value by managing temporary imbalances in demand and supply.”168 
 
The task of managing the resulting real option portfolio is by no means trivial. There 
are four reasons for that: There are a large number of operating options that mature 
daily, the exercise decision is complex due to a large variety of alternatives, options 
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often are interlinked in a complex way and even with a sound real option portfolio, the 
company still is heavily exposed to risk. 
Considering these very different problems, it becomes clear that the firm has to use 
quantitative techniques such as simulations and optimizations in order to manage their 
risk properly. The risk management process in high technology sectors is similar to risk 
management in financial industries: First, establishment of a clear objective, secondly 
development of a suitable policy. The main problem here is that it is often difficult to 
find an appropriate benchmark; because of that one commonly has to rely on estimates. 
 
Contracts can be structured along three dimensions, namely volume, service and price. 
All various procurement contracts add up to a single procurement portfolio. “Each 
procurement portfolio produces a different trade-off between the costs and risks of 
material purchases, inventory, and shortages; and different supply agreements and 
portfolios of supply agreements can be compared based on the company’s trade-off 
between risk exposure and value creation across these performance dimensions.”169 
The sourcing agreements have to be constantly monitored to find out whether the 
performance has been satisfying. It obviously is a dynamic process, in which new 
contracts are established and simultaneously old contracts are renegotiated. The 
importance of spot markets should be emphasised again, because the portfolio should 
always reflect current market conditions. Another characteristic of spot markets is that 
they are intermediating between short-term mismatches between supply and demand. 
 
Another grand issue is a possible opportunistic behaviour of supply chain participants, 
because they frequently possess sensitive information. Biased information exchange 
within the supply chain should be largely avoided by emerging methods. 
It is evident that through the use of structured contracts, efficiency has been gained. 
Some organizations already became “virtual organizations” that avoid large 
investments in physical capital. Their only obligation is to manage the resulting set of 
real options. The performance of firms over the economy depends on the successful 
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quantification of risk and the valuation of flexibility. Summarizing one could say that 
financial aspects are becoming increasingly important also in non-financial industries. 
Concerning valuation, Billington, Johnson and Triantis (2002) noted high demand for 
sound performance metrics in the IT sector. Performance metrics in general “address 
risk and flexibility; in the parlance of supply chain management: the costs and risks of 
not having the right products in the right places at the right times.”170 A rather simple 
approach is the “total sourcing cost” method, where the total costs of a sourcing 
relationship results from the sum of the costs of inventory plus the costs of shortages. A 
more sophisticated approach is the “Value at Risk” concept, which is very popular and 
frequently used in financial industries. The problem of all potential risk measurement 
concepts is that risk in such an environment can not be addressed explicitly. High-tech 
companies generally have to consider three main risks at the end of their supply chain: 
demand, availability and input prices. Nowadays risk management means managing 
“spread options”. One has to think in terms of possible scenarios and not in expected 
demand or supply, to better understand interconnections. 
 
6.2.2.2. Supply Chain Management in the US Automobile Industry 
 
Helper (1991) analysed the situation of the US automobile industry in the 80s. In 
general, relationships “had been characterized by short-term contracts (usually one-
year), arms'-length relationships, and many (usually six to eight) suppliers per part.”171 
This has changed a lot: Nowadays, supplier relations are different in the sense that 
information is exchanged far more extensively between the buyer and a more and more 
decreasing number of suppliers. These changes have to be explained, because at first 
sight the contractor gives up some of its market and bargaining power by supplying to 
fewer parties. There is the following trade-off: “the buyer faces a trade-off between 
promoting technical progress in the industry and maintaining buyer bargaining 
power.”172 In the US, companies have waited for too long to sacrifice some of their 
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bargaining power for the sake of innovation and improved quality. Still, they finally 
started to re-define their preferences. 
 
Helper (1991) developed a conceptual framework. She assumed that the producer has 
only two possibilities regarding the production of components: either he can produce 
them in-house or contract production out to a supplier. What really matters and often is 
underestimated is the commitment between the two parties; communication is vital in 
that context. Following Hirschman’s (1970) terminology: “we can identify two types of 
responses to problems arising in a buyer-supplier relationship: 1) exit, where the 
buyer's response to problems with a supplier is to find a new supplier, and 2) voice, 
where the buyer's response is to work with the original supplier until the problem is 
corrected.”173 
 
Along two dimensions one can distinguish between voice and exit strategies: the degree 
of administrative coordination and the nature of incentive systems. Contractors that 
follow a voice-based strategy need a high degree of administrative coordination and 
strong commitment. The opposite applies to the exit-based strategy. In general, using an 
exit strategy, the buyer improves his bargaining power, whereas the voice strategy is 
superior when rather high investments are required. Summarizing: “I have argued that 
the exit strategy maximizes buyer bargaining power, whereas the voice strategy 
maximizes the rates of most types of technical change. Therefore, a trade-off exists 
between buyer bargaining power and industry technical change.”174 Historically, an 
oscillation between the two strategies can be observed in the automobile sector. 
 
At the beginning of the automobile industry, voice systems were prevalent with 
producers being largely dependent on suppliers. The contractor and the supplier were 
working together very closely and therefore also suppliers played an important role in 
innovation. These relationships with financially unstable suppliers eroded, because part 
makers were specializing in some inputs that were only applicable to some buyers. The 
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contractors had “the desire and the wherewithal to use voice within their organizations 
while moving toward exit relationships with outside suppliers.”175 One should not 
forget, however, that vertical integration inherits various advantages, like geographic 
proximity. As consumers became keener on new products, the voice-based strategy was 
becoming less attractive. Many industry participants began to enter into exit strategy 
relationships with independent suppliers. This led to a highly competitive supplier 
market, and innovation mostly exclusively took place inside the firms. Although this 
strategy of vertical integration of R&D and exit strategy relations with outside suppliers 
first helped to increase growth, it was little helpful when Japanese car producers 
entered the market in the 70s. 
Now let’s take a closer look at the exit-based system. The distinction between exit and 
voice is a rather vague one and in reality things are more complex. Between the 50s and 
the 70s systems were largely exit based: “The relationships within this exit-based 
system fell into three main modes, which I will call 1) simple exit, 2) voice with 
cheating, and 3) financial integration.”176 
Simple exit: every part under a simple exit regime was exposed to annual competitive 
bidding. This system was applied to easy-to-make parts, where the firm did not expect 
to gain a competitive advantage. 
Voice with cheating: here some suppliers were given a higher degree of commitment, 
particularly those who provided some sort of superior service to the contractor. Such 
relationships were often characterized by mutual dependence and a high level of trust 
between individuals of the opposing parties. 
Financial integration: under this regime, one can find 100% ownership structures. 
Commitment was therefore very high, while the administrative coordination did not 
necessarily have to reach such high levels. 
 
The final product market was an oligopoly and the producers succeeded in preventing 
their suppliers from taking their share of the oligopolistic revenues. “The source of their 
success lay in the ability to maintain a credible threat of exit, which they did by using 
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rents gained from power in their final-product market to transform the structure of 
their input markets.”177 At the same time they were facilitating access to the supplier 
markets to guarantee competition and impeding their suppliers from developing own 
expertise. Automakers wanted to ensure that complementary assets would be produced 
under heavy competition. The problem with this system was little innovation for the 
companies and the consumers. Also the rather low degree of administrative 
coordination had a negative impact on product quality. As commitment was even 
stronger on the rise, stagnation eventually set in. 
  
I want to continue the analysis by discussing the voice based system in supplier 
relations. As stated above, we are examining the situation of the industry in the 80s. In 
this decade technology became more important again, due to fiercer competition from 
abroad (mostly Japan). Producers uncommonly made a move towards voice based 
strategy. A new classification had to be made, distinguishing between reputation-based 
voice strategy and financially-based voice strategy. 
Concerning reputation-based voice systems, the administrative coordination was 
substantially higher than in traditional voice relationships. This development resulted in 
long-term rather than short-term contracts. Long-term contracts are exposed to 
opportunistic behaviour in a stronger way, because they inherit a higher degree of 
incompleteness. Under financially-based strategy, administrative coordination was also 
high, but more among inside suppliers. “Whereas in the reputation-based voice mode, 
the automakers sought to increase administrative coordination by increasing 
commitment to their outside suppliers, in financially based voice in the mid-1980s they 
sought to increase coordination by decreasing commitment to their inside suppliers.”178 
A common example is internal benchmarking, where in-house divisions are forced into 
competition with each other on an internal market. Due to faster market changes, 
producers implemented just-in-time techniques and simultaneously increased R&D 
spending. At the same time the bargaining power of the contractors was reduced and 
consumers demanded higher quality standards. 
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Summarizing the prevalent lines of argument: “the automakers' power over their 
suppliers is due not to some exogenous characteristic of the industry, but rather to a 
particular strategy adopted by Detroit's Big Three. The auto companies, […] are highly 
vulnerable to oligopolistic suppliers. The automakers' investment in keeping the 
supplier industry competitive has been the key to their success in maintaining 
bargaining power.”179 Because uncertainty in the industry was on the rise, inside 
suppliers suffered from divestments. 
The above described transition from exit to voice relations is highly capital intensive. 
Internal organizational structural changes have to be made, because “The exit-based 
strategy requires the buyer to invest heavily in design engineers and only a little in 
internal communications, whereas the voice strategy requires expensive communication 
and evaluation systems and few design engineers.”180 Suppliers also had to change and 
laid their focus to a greater extent on innovative capabilities. Some of the rather new 
relationships should be classified in a new way; Helper (1991) for instance labelled one 
of the new categories as “new exit”: “New exit differs from the old exit system in that 
suppliers have a slightly longer leash (three-year contracts instead of one-year), and 
buyers threaten to exit not just because of high prices, but because of low quality and 
lack of just-in-time delivery as well. The increase in commitment (though often quite 
contingent) should offer some incentives for investment, but this scenario offers little 
prospect of developing the trust necessary for long-term high levels of administrative 
coordination or of technical change.”181 
 
 
6.3. Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
Alvarez and Stenbecka (2007) observed that outsourcing had become a commonly used 
business practice in recent years. Outsourcing processes are mainly due to marginal 
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cost economies, where mostly North American or European companies contract out to 
low-wage countries such as India or China. This outsourcing decision inherits a trade-
off between the necessary monitoring costs associated with a sourcing relationship and 
the cost advantage associated with such an agreement. The whole analysis depends on 
the fact that a firm can decide independently which proportion to outsource and which 
proportion to produce in-house. 
 
Before actually conducting their explications, Alvarez and Stenbacka (2007) made an 
important assumption: The potential suppliers have comparative cost advantages in 
producing the demanded good or service, due to higher efficiency. There is a trade-off 
between achieving a higher efficiency – and therefore higher revenues – and the 
commitment of making an irreversible investment in a sense that sunk investments have 
to be made in order to establish such a sourcing agreement. Outsourcing is always 
accompanied by uncertainty about future profit. 
 
Under one condition complete outsourcing is optimal. Judging a critical-cost ratio, it 
can be argued that “increased volatility decelerates the introduction of a system of 
outsourcing,”182 which in my opinion is a debatable argument. Secondly they attest that 
increased overall market uncertainty will inevitably postpone the sourcing decision, 
because the real option value of the postponement is increased under such 
circumstances. This clearly is in conflict with other author’s opinions. On the other 
hand, an increase in market uncertainty can also stimulate outsourcing, because the 
optimal sourcing proportion might also be increased. 
Outsourcing can also be interpreted as “a disciplining device with the purpose of 
generating a benchmark against which to foster the competitiveness of in-house 
production.”183 Undoubtedly the most important finding was the proof that if market 
uncertainty increases, the decision to vertically disintegrate is postponed. As stated 
above, this argument is inconsistent with common business wisdom. Nevertheless, one 
has to be careful about this conclusion, because once the production mode has been 
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introduced, increased market uncertainty more likely leads to a higher outsourcing 
proportion. 
 
 
6.4. Valuation 
 
Van Mieghem’s (1999) aim was to constitute a sound valuation technique for the option 
of subcontracting by using a market stochastic game. Participants are a manufacturer 
and a subcontractor. Subcontracting can be viewed as an exchange between the product 
provided by the supplier and the money of the manufacturer. What is important to 
mention is that in some cases it might be advantageous to leave some contract 
parameters unspecified. 
There are different ways of looking at subcontracting: First, strategic literature argues 
that “a firm should concentrate on its core competencies and strategically out- source 
other activities (Quinn and Hilmer 1994).”184 The decision to subcontract inherits many 
risks, most notably the dependence on the subcontractor and overall vulnerability, like 
the possible loss of a competitive advantage. Secondly, looking at options literature, the 
biggest advantage of outsourcing lies in a significant increase of flexibility with respect 
to production and capacity planning. Thirdly, from a financial perspective, the most 
important aspect is risk diversification. Operating costs are lowered and therefore 
overall cost efficiency is improved. A firm entering in a subcontracting relationship 
probably also will experience smoothing of production levels. 
 
 
The firms will only enter into a relationship if it is beneficial for them and contract 
compliance is voluntary. Considering transfer prices, the author stipuilated: “Thus, for 
low to medium transfer prices, more uncertainty makes higher manufacturing requests 
more likely, creating a stronger incentive for the supplier to invest in extra capacity, 
which makes outsourcing more likely. For high transfer prices, on the other hand, more 
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uncertainty increases the expected total transfer cost to the manufacturer who will 
prefer more in-house capacity, making outsourcing less likely.”185 
 
 
6.5. Discussion 
 
The most popular motives for outsourcing are the realization of cost savings, the wish 
to focus on a core of business and cost restructuring. Nonetheless, many more motives 
can be identified, such as tax benefits, risk management considerations, access to 
knowledge or capacity management. Sourcing decisions are often accompanied by 
public criticism – especially in the case of offshoring (i.e. when a company transfers an 
organizational function to another country). Opposition claims that the national labour 
market is damaged due to disruption of jobs and insecurity of employment, whereas 
proponents argue that outsourcing – if exercised correctly – should decrease prices in 
the long term, thereby providing economic benefit. 
 
If a company outsources to a low-wage country, the question of corporate social 
responsibility or business ethics come into play. Again, there are two different lines of 
argument: On the one hand, many people are of the opinion that lower paid workers are 
exploited by globally operating firms, on the other hand at least some people in those 
low-wage countries are employed and overall wealth may be increased. 
Another controversial topic is quality. A sourcing contract should always contain a so-
called service level agreement, which is a measurement tool of quality; nevertheless, 
there are many contracts that in fact do not inherit such a clause. Again, many different 
interests come into play: Management might accept lower quality to address certain 
business needs such as realizing a lower price, whereas end consumers might be 
unsatisfied when realizing a change in product or service quality. 
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Considering sourcing decisions, one can identify an incredible need for information. 
Innumerous parameters come into play and the firm has to rely on many 
approximations, based on heuristic models and managerial intuition and experience. In 
history we have seen different outsourcing trends in different sectors of the economy. 
Successful vertical integration depends on extensive and fluent exchange of 
information, which is nowadays easier due to an increasingly globalized world on basis 
of a high standard in information technology. In my opinion sourcing relationships 
often lack sound strategy communication and clear definition of responsibilities. 
 
Core competencies are vital to a firm, because they provide consumer benefits and – 
per definition – are difficult to imitate; they are relative strengths in comparison to 
competitors. Various aspects surrounding those abilities are hard to identify. 
Companies must do everything to achieve such a position is some field of operation if 
they want to stay competitive. 
There are some important trade-offs: a firm should concentrate only on some core 
competencies, because it cannot reach highest industry standard in many activities 
simultaneously. Still, management should not make the mistake of concentrating on 
only one core competence, because external market changes that are not influentiable 
by the company might erode the potential. So there is a trade-off between concentration 
on and diversification between  core competencies. A firm’s competences form a 
portfolio that has to be managed on basis of risk deliberations. 
 
Furthermore, core competencies have to be protected from imitation by competitors. As 
we have heard earlier, a process that is easy to copy can never provide a competitive 
advantage. Occasionally the toughest task is the identification of a core competency, 
because corporate strategy concentrates on those activities. Over time companies may 
face the problem of having labelled a peripheral activity as being close to the core. This 
leads to fatal implications, because the firm loses its base of success. 
Finally discussing Real Option Analysis, I want to emphasize that all underlying 
models provide only vague approximations that in fact contain a lot of uncertainty. 
Models in Real Option valuation originate from Financial Option valuation and many 
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assumptions that are already problematic in the financial world, become yet more 
complex and massive in a Real Option context. Management has to take both external 
(mainly political) and internal (organizational) considerations into account and should 
never rely exclusively on purely technical valuations. The importance of such 
deliberations is, in my opinion, underestimated in Real Option literature.  
 
Another problem is contradicting interests: stakeholders have the incentive to 
overevaluate Real Options and vend those over-optimistic valuations as “future 
potential” or “growth opportunity” to shareholders. Those values are plainly 
hypothetical numbers that often lack connection to real values. 
Increased flexibility is always seen as a very positive implication of Real Option 
thinking. Still, management should be aware that the maintenance of a significant 
degree of flexibility inherits costs and is again associated with a higher level of 
uncertainty. In this context I would like to make a reference to the “Investment timing” 
section.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
Summing up, we have analyzed the main aspects surrounding Real Options, looked at 
various organizational decision making theories and finally showed the importance of 
Real Option thinking in the context of sourcing decisions. It was difficult to clearly 
address, compare and evaluate the different implications from different fields of 
scientific research. While always focusing on the core, I have tried my best to also 
include seemingly rather peripherical facts. Nontheless, one always has to keep in mind 
that all these models rest on different assumptions, which exacerbates the development 
of a sound strategic governance policy. 
 
The most obvious difficulty of the Real Option approach lies in its inherent 
impreciseness. One has to rely on proxies, based on probabilities, and volatility in my 
opinion is underestimated in many cases. Still, it is a powerful tool to make uncertainty 
more understandable and measurable – at least to some extent. 
The transition from Financial Options to Real Options bears many problems, because 
we transfer assumptions from a perfect, highly competitive economy to reality – just 
think of Black/Scholes or Merton in this context.  
Furthermore, it has to be stated that we only analyzed the position if the contractor. The 
subcontractor in our surroundings faces a short option and up to now only few authors 
have concentrated on this other side of the medal. 
 
Also the classification of Real Options is not perfect. Categories do overlap a lot and 
one could think of many more dimensions as a means to differentiate between Real 
Option characteristics (such as size, hierarchy, maturity, economic sector). 
From my point of view the role of flexibility is overoptimistically interpreted by many 
authors. Even though flexibility increases the managerial scope of action, the cost of a 
higher level of flexibility should not be forgotten and also overall uncertainty rises. 
In addition, Real Option Analysis should include more external (political) and internal 
(organizational) considerations, as both of them heavily influence the calculations. 
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My main criticism lies in the over-evaluation of future potential. This effect of 
“vending” future potential to shareholders already has been discussed to greater detail. 
We have seen that many different and sometimes contradicting interests come into play. 
 
Without any doubt, there are many fields that need closer scientific examination – 
mainly in organizational questions, but also from a financial point of view. The above 
stated dilemmas are some of the future challenges in scientific research; the goal 
remains unchanged: to establish a broad framework for outsourcing decisions on a Real 
Option basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real Option Analysis and its Application on Outsourcing                                     103 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
8. Appendix 
 
 
8.1. English Summary 
 
In this paper I first introduced the main concepts of Financial Options in order to make 
the understanding of Real Options easier; those two derivative concepts share a 
common basis, nevertheless there are some strikingly important differences that needed 
to be explained. During that process I explained the option terminology, differentiated 
between call and put options and showed how a change in one underlying variable 
(ceteris paribus) changes the overall value of an option. 
Basic Concepts of Real Options have been examined, thereby also looking at valuation 
purposes, such as the Discounted Cash Flow and the Net Present Value method. As we 
have seen, those models almost perfectly apply to Financial Options; remember that 
when looking at Real Option valuation, those concepts were by far less reliable. A 
possible classification of Real Options was drawn, including the options of timing, 
staging, exit, operating, flexibility, switching, growth and compound options. 
 
In the second section of the paper I discussed the main differences as well as 
similarities between the widely used decision making theories, focussing on the 
Transaction Cost Theory, Resource Based View and Real Option Theory. With respect 
to the different theories pointed at different assumptions underlying those schemes and 
described their theoretical underpinnings. Various opinions of different authors were 
included in this section – supporting ones as well as criticizing ones. Within this section 
the focus has been put on Real Option Theory and some individual options were 
explained to greater extent, such as options to defer investment, growth options, 
embedded options, shadow options and option chains. Also investment timing 
(considering the option to wait), technological platforms, technology positioning and 
restructuring profiles were taken into account. 
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The decisive part of this paper was, without any doubt, the application of Real Option 
Theory on sourcing decisions. Therefore I first introduced some ideas that are important 
in sourcing decisions, concentrating on core competencies, partial outsourcing and 
equilibrium models (industry equilibrium, a duopoly case and Bertrand competition). 
Another important aspect was to display analogies to other networking forms, drawing 
similarities to joint ventures and supply chain management in the high technology 
sector and the automobile sector. Lastly, more theoretical underpinnings and some 
valuation purposes were introduced. 
 
 
8.2. German Summary 
 
Am Anfang dieser Diplomarbeit stand die Präsentation der wichtigsten Charakteristika 
von Finanzoptionen, um ein besseres Verständnis von Realoptionen zu ermöglichen. 
Wie gezeigt wurde, haben diese beiden Konzepte eine gemeinsame Basis (vor allem im 
Hinblick auf die Finanzmathematik). Trotzdem wurden die größten Unterschiede 
hervorgehoben und die Konsequenzen derselben aufgezeigt. 
Um eine Grundlage für die späteren Kapitel zu schaffen, wurde die Terminologie der 
Finanzoptionen erklärt und die wichtigsten Konzepte kurz umrissen: Zum einen der 
Unterschied zwischen einer Put- und einer Calloption und zum anderen die 
unvergleichliche Eigendynamik, die diese Instrumente entwickeln, wenn sich eine 
wichtige Variable ändert. Wie aufgezeigt wurde, können schon kleine Änderungen in 
einer Variablen zu großen Unterschieden im Gesamtwert einer Option führen. 
 
In weiterer Folge wurden drei wesentliche Organisationstheorien vorgestellt – die 
Transaktionskostentheorie, die Ressourcentheorie und natürlich die 
Realoptionentheorie – und ihre wesentlichen Merkmale aufgezeigt. Danach wurden 
diese besagten Entscheidungstheorien auf Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten 
untersucht.  In diesem Kapitel ging es mir besonders darum, die wichtigsten Prämissen 
der einzelnen Theorien zu zeigen und hervor zu streichen, dass eben diese Unterschiede 
in den Annahmen einen Vergleich nach streng wissenschaftlichen Maßstäben kaum 
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ermöglichen. Weiters wurden möglichst entgegengesetzte Meinungen von diversen 
Autoren präsentiert, um die auf Spannungsfelder innerhalb dieser Organisationstheorien 
aufmerksam zu machen. 
Einzelne Facetten von Realoptionen, die konzeptionell von größerer Bedeutung als 
andere sind, wurden eingehender untersucht. Unter ihnen fanden sich die 
Verzögerungsoptionen, Wachstumsoptionen, Schattenoptionen und das Konzept von 
Optionsketten, aber auch die Wichtigkeit des Timings bei Investmententscheidungen, 
technologische Plattformen und technologische Positionierung sowie mögliche Formen 
einer Restrukturierung eines Unternehmens. 
 
Der zweifelsohne wichtigste Teil dieser wissenschaftlichen Arbeit war die Anwendung 
der Realoptionentheorie auf Outsourcingentscheidungen. In Zuge dessen war es 
notwendig, die wichtigsten Aspekte von Auslagerungsentscheidungen vorzustellen. 
Besonders die Bedeutung von Kernkompetenzen, gradueller Auslagerung, sowie 
unterschiedliche Gleichgewichtsmodelle (industrielles Gleichgewicht, die Existenz 
eines Duopols und Bertrand-Wettbewerb) wurde hervorgehoben. 
Um eine Analyse im Bereich Outsourcing überhaupt zu ermöglichen, wurden Parallelen 
zu anderen Netzwerkformen gezogen – insbesondere zu Joint Ventures, Management 
von Lieferketten in der Hochtechnologie und der Automobilindustrie. 
Zu guter Letzt wurden noch in aller gebotener Kürze weitere theoretische Konzepte, 
sowie Bewertungskriterien präsentiert. 
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